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SPATIAL TERRORISM
Dawinder S. Sidhu*
ABSTRACT
Terrorism, under federal law, generally means an act of politically
or socially motivated violence perpetrated against innocents.
Terrorism within the meaning of federal law, in other words, exists
only if a cognizable and particular motive is uncovered. This
definition also sees the United States as an undifferentiated
landscape; by its own terms, it fails to take into account any
geographic nuance in acts of mass violence.
This Article suggests that spatial considerations are relevant in
determining whether an act of mass violence constitutes an act of
terrorism for purposes of federal law. It points to cities—which are
characterized by a highly concentrated, fluid population, and which
thus have more potential victims of indiscriminate violence—to
demonstrate the propriety of considering space in an analysis of
whether terrorism has occurred. It further argues that spatial
dimensions lend support to shifting the definition of terrorism away
from an exclusively instrumental, subjective intent model and towards
a more comprehensive descriptive, objective action paradigm.
The existing terrorism scheme has generated confusion and
unsatisfactory results. As incidents of mass violence continue to
occur, the need for a coherent terrorism definition is particularly
pressing and acute for prosecutors, judges, public officials, and a
society attempting to conceptualize and categorize these incidents.
Spatial considerations may provide greater consistency and clarity to
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the existing definitions of terrorism, further the underlying purposes
of defining terrorism as an independent legal harm, and catalyze a
recalibrated, proper definition of terrorism.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent months, the people of the United States have witnessed
and suffered several incidents of mass violence. The incidents—fresh
in the hearts and minds of the people1—need no elaboration. Brief
examples are therefore sufficient to provide the necessary factual
background for this legal discussion.
On July 20, 2012, in Aurora, Colorado, James Holmes tossed gas
canisters into a movie theater crowd that had assembled for the
premiere of a widely anticipated feature film, and then proceeded to
open fire, killing twelve individuals.2 On August 5, 2012, Wade

1. These incidents, to borrow a phrase from the Supreme Court, are “too recent
to be called history.” Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 71 (1872).
2. See Dan Frosch & Kirk Johnson, Gunman Kills 12 in Colorado, Reviving Gun
Debate, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/21/us/shootingat-colorado-theater-showing-batman-movie.html. “The total number of victims,” the
Department of Justice assessed, “is more than 1,500.” Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Office for Victims of Crime Announces $2.9 Million Grant to Support
Victims in Aurora, Colo. (Feb. 13, 2013), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/
newsroom/pressreleases/2013/ojppr021313.pdf (“This includes the twelve killed, sixtynine wounded and their families, other people in the theater complex at that time,
people evacuated from an apartment complex where explosive devices were
discovered, and first responders to the emergency.”).
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Michael Page entered the grounds of a Sikh temple in Oak Creek,
Wisconsin, killing six worshippers and ultimately killing himself
during a firefight with responding law enforcement officers.3 On
December 14, 2012, Adam Lanza shot and killed twenty-seven
individuals, including twenty children (none older than seven years
old), at the Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown,
Connecticut, meeting the same self-inflicted fate as Page.4 On April
14, 2013, twin bombs exploded near the finish line of the Boston
Marathon, killing three and injuring over 170 individuals.5
These incidents are unique in their respective factual
circumstances. They are bound nonetheless by a common, selfevident truth: each was a horrific event in which numerous innocent
lives (and only innocent lives) were targeted and violently eliminated.
It is perhaps because of the heinous nature and scale of the incidents
that public leaders at the highest levels and others have considered
the incidents to be acts of terrorism. For example, speaking at a
memorial service for the victims of the Oak Creek shooting, Attorney
General Eric Holder stated, without equivocation, that “precisely
what happened here [was] an act of terrorism.”6 In remarks following
the twin bombings in Boston, President Obama called the incident
“an act of terrorism.”7 President Obama also declared, “Any time
bombs are used to target innocent civilians, it is an act of terror.”8
Given the underlying and unifying qualities of these incidents, in
which many innocents (and only innocents) were randomly targeted
and killed, the Attorney General and the President’s particular
assessments, as well as the President’s general rule, seem appropriate.

3. See Rick Romell, 7 Killed, Including Shooter, at Sikh Temple in Oak Creek, J.
SENTINEL (Milwaukee), Aug. 6, 2012, http://www.jsonline.com/news/crime/reports-ofpeople-shot-at-sikh-temple-in-oak-creek-qc6cgc0-165059506.html;
see
also
Transcripts, CNN (Aug. 6, 2012), http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/
1208/06/cnr.03.html (containing statement of Oak Creek Police Chief John Edwards).
4. See Connor Simpson et al., Newtown School Shooting: Live Updates,
ATLANTIC WIRE (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.theatlanticwire.com/national/2012/12/
newtown-connecticut-school-shooting/59999/.
5. See Chelsea Conaboy et al., Investigation of Boston Marathon Bombings
Continues, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 16, 2013, http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2013/
04/16/some-areas-downtown-boston-reopen-today-boston-marathon-bombinginvestigation-continues/qTROe6L0b98qRl9W7dnWiJ/story.html.
6. Eric Holder, Att’y Gen. of the United States, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Speech at
Oak Creek Memorial Service (Aug. 10, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/
speeches/2012/ag-speech-1208101.html.
7. Mark Landler, Obama Calls Blasts an ‘Act of Terrorism’, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
16,
2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/17/us/politics/obama-calls-marathonbombings-an-act-of-terrorism.html.
8. Id.
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Federal law, however, seems to disagree. Federal law generally
requires that an act of violence be politically or socially motivated to
constitute an act of terrorism.9 With respect to the Oak Creek
shooting, for example, the perpetrator died at the scene, frustrating
any attempt to identify his motive.10 Other evidence obtained since
the shooting has failed to reveal the motivation necessary to consider
it an “act of terror” under federal law.11 Thus, the Attorney General’s
emphatic statement that the Oak Creek shooting constituted
terrorism cannot be squared with federal terrorism law. With respect
to the Boston bombings, to provide another example, President
Obama called the incident an act of terrorism before there was any
knowledge of who committed the atrocities, let alone why.12 Yet the
“why”—a political or social motive—needs to be present in order for
federal terrorism law to follow. Accordingly, due to the absence of an
identifiable motive, President Obama’s statement that the Boston
Marathon bombings were an act of terrorism could not be supported
under federal law.
As these examples reveal, there is an important disconnect
between the leaders’ positions—which seem tied to the abhorrent
nature of the incidents—and the existing federal definitions—which
are tied, by contrast, to subjective motivation.13 The Articles in this
issue of the Fordham Urban Law Journal explore the relationship
between cities and terrorism. This particular Article argues that the
spatial characteristics of an incident may help inform the normative
question as to when an incident should qualify as “terrorism” within
9. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (2012). See generally infra Part II.A.
10. See SCOTT MCALLISTER, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE & ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T
OF HOMELAND SEC., TESTIMONY ON “HATE CRIMES AND DOMESTIC EXTREMISM”
BEFORE THE UNITED STATES SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2012),
available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/9-19-12McAllisterTestimony.pdf.
11. A report issued months after the shooting notes, at the outset, that “[n]o one
knows what drove Wade Michael Page to walk into the Sikh Temple of Wisconsin on
a Sunday morning last August and start shooting worshippers with a 9 mm handgun.”
Marilyn Elias, Sikh Temple Killer Wade Michael Page Radicalized in Army,
INTELLIGENCE REP., Winter 2012, available at http://www.splcenter.org/getinformed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2012/winter/massacre-in-wisconsin.
12. See Boston Bombings: Obama Condemns ‘Act of Terrorism’, BBC NEWS
(Apr. 16, 2013), www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-22171684 (“President Barack
Obama has condemned the twin bombing at the Boston Marathon as a ‘terrorist
act’ . . . . [T]he motive and culprit were not yet known and no-one was in custody.”).
13. Compare id., with CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HOMELAND SECURITY AND THE
PRIVATE SECTOR 1 (2004), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/
ftpdocs/60xx/doc6042/12-20-homelandsecurity.pdf (defining terrorism as “criminal
acts by individuals or groups . . . motivated by political or social agendas” (emphasis
added)).
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the meaning of federal law. It suggests specifically that the spatial
dimensions of an incident not only matter, but indicate that the
federal definition of terrorism should be triggered by “objective”
conduct, not just by “subjective” motivation. That is, in resolving the
apparent tension between the “what” (the objective paradigm) and
the “why” (the subjective paradigm), the “where” (spatial
considerations) of an incident is both relevant and points to the
propriety of including the objective side of the spectrum in federal
terrorism law.
This Article arrives at this conclusion by way of the following
structure: Part I looks to the early conceptual foundations of
terrorism—that which causes terror or fright (a descriptive
understanding) and that which is calculated to cause terror or fright
(an instrumental understanding). It also explores the first-order
purposes of terrorism law: to socially marginalize the perpetrator of
premeditated mass violence against innocents, and to apply an
especially robust set of legal punishments to individuals that are
deemed to be “terrorists.” Part II summarizes the current definition
of terrorism under federal law. It also applies this definition to the
four aforementioned incidents to demonstrate how the existing
definition works in practice.
Drawing on other doctrinal areas that take physical settings into
account, Part III suggests that the geographic qualities of an act of
violence are salient in ascertaining whether “terrorism” has occurred.
Cities, for example, are home to more innocents and thus more
potential victims of indiscriminate violence. Part III also addresses
whether, aside from cities, other spaces in our society, such as schools
or places of worship, deserve special solicitude from federal terrorism
laws. From this discussion, it proposes this definition: “terrorism”
means premeditated violence perpetrated indiscriminately against
innocents, where the factors that may support the terrorism
designation are whether the violence was (1) perpetrated in an area
with a high concentration of innocents, a public area of constitutional
significance wherein individuals congregate or associate, or an area
essential to the operation of the government wherein individuals
work, engage in official government business, or are educated, or (2)
calculated to further a political, religious, or social agenda. Next, Part
III will apply this reformulated understanding of terrorism—one that
acknowledges an objective or descriptive paradigm of terrorism—to
the same four incidents to show how the proposed definition would
play out. Part IV responds to potential counterarguments, including
the concern that an “objective” definition of terrorism is too generous
and will dilute its meaning, by offering limiting principles. This Part
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also makes clear that while objective conduct is the preferred
definition of terrorism according to this Article, motive-based
terrorism still may fall within that definition.
“Terrorism” remains, perhaps inherently, an ambiguous and
loaded term. At present, there are outstanding questions as to why
one incident is designated an act of terrorism, while another not.14 As
with obscenity, a belief as to whether terrorism has occurred seems
grounded more in an intuitive, visceral reaction than in the
dispassionate application of established rules.15 Whether an incident
falls within the bounds of terrorism seems more personal than
formal,16 and these judgment calls are further complicated by the soft
borders between terrorism and other categories of cognizable harm,
such as simple premeditated murder.17
This Article does not pretend to solve the definitional problems
with “terrorism,” but attempts to offer considerations that may tend
to reduce not only the indeterminacy associated with the term, but
the apparent mismatch between political or social views as to when
terrorism occurs, on the one hand, and the law as to when terrorism
has occurred, on the other. Therefore, in terms of the practical value
of this Article, it suggests specifically that an appreciation for the
geographic variations of an incident can clarify when the terrorism
label is appropriate. Further, it shows how federal definitions of
terrorism informed by spatial dimensions comport more fully with,
and allow for the fuller expression of, the social disapproval of certain

14. See, e.g., Glenn Greenwald, Why Is Boston ‘Terrorism’ but not Aurora,
Sandy Hook, Tucson and Columbine?, GUARDIAN (London), Apr. 22, 2013,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/apr/22/boston-marathon-terrorismaurora-sandy-hook; see also Scott Wong, Claire McCaskill: If Boston Bombings are
Terrorism, Why not Sandy Hook?, POLITICO (Apr. 17, 2013), http://www.politico.
com/story/2013/04/claire-mccaskill-terrorism-boston-marathon-sandy-hook90213.html?hp=l2.
15. See Jacqueline S. Hodgson & Victor Tadros, The Impossibility of Defining
Terrorism, 16 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 494, 495 (2013) (“We are often secure in our
knowledge that a terrorist attack has been committed when we see it, yet a credible
definition of terrorism eludes us.”).
16. See id.
17. See Lloyd J. Dumas, Counterterrorism and Economic Policy, 21 TRANSNAT’L
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 85 (2012) (“All acts of terrorism committed by nongovernmental groups are crimes. They involve such acts as . . . murder . . . .”); see
also Christopher L. Blakesley, Ruminations on Terrorism & Anti-Terrorism Law &
Literature, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1041, 1097 (2003) (“If a common crime such as
murder is committed in a manner that conforms to terrorism, it appears that the
terror element functions as an aggravating factor, enhancing the punishment.”).
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incidents.18 More broadly, this Article supports an amendment to the
federal definition of terrorism so that it includes objective conduct
and considers spatial context.
In doctrinal terms, this Article seeks to build on the important
work of legal scholars who are exploring the relationship between
space and the law generally19 and who, in the specific realm of
terrorism, are calling attention to the “vertical” relationship between
the federal government and state/local governments in the national
security apparatus, where the dominant focus in the national security
context has been on the “horizontal” dynamics between the three
branches of the federal government.20 This Article hopes to enrich
the emerging conversation on space and to highlight the deeper
complexities even within the sub-federal plane by showing that
federal terrorism law should be mindful of variations in setting.

I. PURPOSES OF THE “TERRORISM” CLASSIFICATION
A. Basic Meanings of the Term
The term “terrorism,” as may be obvious, is derived from the root
word “terror.”21 Prior to the founding of the United States, the word
“terror” was descriptive; it was used as a synonym for other words
that each described a state of fright or horror. For example, in 1756,
Edmund Burke, the prominent Irish political philosopher, observed
that that politicians “cause terror and hatred.”22 He also referenced
the “mixed passion of terror and surprise” that a man may experience
upon being extricated from a dangerous situation,23 likened terror to
“pain and danger”24 and “panic,”25 stated that “excessive loudness”

18. At present, the leaders seem constrained in the use of “terrorism” in the
immediate aftermath of incidents, and are instead inclined to wait until a motive can
be unearthed. See Halimah Abdullah, Obama Has Learned Tough Lessons on Using
the Word ‘Terror’, CNN (Apr. 16, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/16/politics/
terror-word/index.html.
19. See, e.g., Allan Erbsen, Constitutional Spaces, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1168 (2011).
20. See generally Matthew Waxman, National Security Federalism in the Age of
Terror, 64 STAN. L. REV. 289 (2012).
21. Terrorist, VOCABULARY.COM, http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/terrorist
(last visited Oct. 19, 2013).
22. 1 THE WORKS OF THE RIGHT HONOURABLE EDMUND BURKE 20 (James Prior
ed., London, George Bell & Sons 1886).
23. Id. at 71; see also id. at 80 (calling “terror” a “passion”).
24. Id. at 74.
25. Id. at 200.
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and “night” enhance our “terror,”26 and claimed “love” is the
opposite of “terror.”27
This country’s founding generation was aware of this descriptive
understanding of terror.28 In fact, the founding generation’s use of the
word “terror” is consistent with this particular meaning of the word.
For example, John Quincy Adams, writing to John Adams, observed
that the people of the Netherlands “live[] in constant terror”—a
condition or state of fear—as they were sandwiched between two
imposing countries.29
The word “terror” took on a secondary meaning with the French
Revolution’s “Reign of Terror,” where, in under a year, thousands
were killed and tens of thousands were arrested.30 The founding
generation used the phrase “Reign of Terror” in their writings.31 The
“Reign of Terror” came to signify the use of terror, generally, as an
instrument to agitate or excite another, and, specifically, as an
instrument used in the context of civil conflict or political unrest.32
“Terror,” combined with the French suffix “isme,” meaning “the
practice of,” gives us “terrorism”: the practice of terror.33
In the early years of our nation, there were thus two overall viable
meanings to “terror”—a descriptive meaning that has its origins prior
26. Id. at 109, 110.
27. Id. at 130.
28. See, e.g., GEORGE MASON, AN APPENDIX TO AN ESSAY ON DESIGN IN
GARDENING 6 (London, John White 1795) (discussing Burke’s essay on “terror”).
29. Letter from John Quincy Adams to John Adams (Sept. 12, 1795) (on file with
the Massachusetts Historical Society).
30. See Hon. Louis G. Fields, Jr., Contemporary Terrorism and the Rule of Law,
113 MIL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1986) (noting that the “Reign of Terror” is the “period
between September 1793 and July 1794 . . . during which an estimated 20,000 persons
were killed and some 300,000 arrested.”).
31. See, e.g., Letter from John Quincy Adams to John Adams 2 (May 20, 1797)
(on file with the Massachusetts Historical Society) (noting the imprisonment of an
individual “during the time which they call the reign of terror”); Letter from Abigail
Adams to William Cranch 3–4 (Nov. 15, 1797) (draft on file with the Massachusetts
Historical Society) (“[T]he Reign of Terror and absolute despotism has again
commenced in France by the overthrow and banishment of every man disposed to
the system of moderation justice & peace . . . . [I]n the Chaos which France is plunged
no order or harmony can arise, and we have nothing to look for, but Robbery and
plunder so long as we expose our property unarmed to their grasp . . . .”).
32. See David B. Kopel & Joseph Olson, Preventing a Reign of Terror: Civil
Liberties Implications of Terrorism Legislation, 21 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 247, 251
(1996) (“[T]he term ‘terrorism’ originated in the French Revolution . . . .”); see also
JURGEN HABERMAS, PHILOSOPHY IN A TIME OF TERROR: DIALOGUES WITH JURGEN
HABERMAS AND JACQUES DERRIDA 152 (2003) (“The current usage of the term
‘terrorism’ derives from the late phase of the French Revolution, when Robespierre’s
Reign of Terror engaged in mass executions and purges of civilians.”).
33. See JONATHAN MATUSITZ, TERRORISM AND COMMUNICATION 1 (2013).
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to the French Revolution, and an instrumental meaning that stems
from the French Revolution. The authoritative 1828 Webster’s
American Dictionary of the English Language,34 which took twenty
years to complete,35 reflects this dual meaning. The dictionary notes
at the outset that “terror” is derived from the Latin terreo, or “to
frighten.”36 It then contains both strands of the meaning of “terror.”
First, “terror” signals “[t]hat which may excite dread [or that is] the
cause of extreme fear.”37 In other words, “terror” can be a
circumstance, a trigger or catalyst that causes the unpleasant
emotions; it is “that” which generates or provokes “terror.” This
meaning aligns with the early descriptive meaning.
The dictionary also defines “terror” as “[t]he threatenings of
wicked men, or evil apprehended from them,” and “[a]wful majesty,
calculated to impress fear.”38 Under this meaning, “terror” is caused
or planned by deplorable individuals to generate uncomfortable
emotions in others.39 This second definition of “terror” thus follows
the instrumental meaning—similar to the “reign of terror.” In short,
“terror” is that which may lead to fright and horror, and “terror” is
also a tactic of fear used by others. Again, “terror” is what causes
others to tremble, and what is calculated to cause others to tremble.
“Terrorism” tracks both definitions of “terror.”
The word
“terrorism” in the United States did not emerge as its own conceptual
phrase until after the French Revolution of the late-eighteenth
century. For example, it does not appear in the 1828 Webster’s
dictionary as a separate entry. “Terrorism” first found its way into an
American judicial opinion in 1862, when the Court of Appeals of New
York, in Eadie v. Slimmon, found void an insurance policy that was
obtained because of “force, terrorism and coercion which overcame

34. The dictionary has been cited in thirty-two Supreme Court opinions, including
lead opinions in major cases, such as District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 581
(2008), Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004), and one hundred forty-four
federal court opinions (based on a Westlaw search last performed on July 19, 2013).
See Steven G. Calabresi & Andrea Matthews, Originalism and Loving v. Virginia,
2012 BYU L. REV. 1393, 1424 (referring to the dictionary as “authoritative”).
35. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 207 n.15 (2003) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
36. The first entry of “terror” repeats this basic meaning: “Extreme fear; violent
dread; fright; fear that agitates the body and mind.” 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN
AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (New York, S. Converse 1828).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. “Terror” has two other entries in Webster’s dictionary: “In Scripture, the
sudden judgments of God are called terrors;” “Death is emphatically styled the king
of terrors.” Id.
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free agency.”40 The word does not make its first appearance in a
federal court opinion until 1879 in the ordinary context of lawyer
disbarment. The attorney in question was suspected of inciting his
clients to influence the outcome of a case by way of “exciting the fears
of the judge by the terrorism of newspaper attacks and abusive
circulars.”41 The attorney appears to have used terrorism in the
instrumental sense: to intimidate the court. Eadie suggests that the
instrumental meaning of terror is not the sole province of
revolutionaries or political actors.
Around the same time,
“terrorism” was mentioned by federal courts in similarly mundane
contexts of the execution of an estate,42 labor protests,43 and
jurisdiction to issue an injunction.44 The Supreme Court first used the
term in 1906.45 In Fisher v. Baker, a writ of habeas corpus was
suspended in the Philippine Islands (then controlled by the United
States) because “there exists a state of insecurity and terrorism.”46
The mention of a “state . . . of terrorism” reinforces the notion that
terrorism contains two meanings, descriptive and instrumental.
Indeed, while the 1828 edition of Webster’s dictionary only has
entries for “terror” and not “terrorism,” the 1913 edition has a
separate entry for “terrorism.” According to that text, “terrorism” is
defined both as “[t]he act of terrorizing, or state of being terrorized,”
which follows the descriptive model, as well as “a mode of
government by terror or intimidation,” which aligns with the
instrumental model.47 This gives credence to the suggestion that the
early understandings of “terror” and “terrorism” have both
descriptive and instrumental meanings.
In sum, although “terror” as an instrument of civil conflict or
political unrest found its genesis in the French Revolution, it is clear
that “terror” also had a descriptive meaning prior to and independent
from that political event. Accordingly, “terrorism” arguably gained
an additional, supplemental meaning, rather than its exclusive or
original meaning, from the “reign of terror.” In modern times, as

40. Eadie v. Slimmon, 26 N.Y. 9, 12 (1862).
41. Ex parte Cole, 6 F. Cas. 35, 37 (C.C.D. Iowa 1879) (No. 2973).
42. See Lipse’s Ex’r v. Spears’ Ex’r, 88 F. 952, 956 (C.C.W.D. Va. 1882).
43. See Thomas v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Tex. Pac. Ry. Co., 62 F. 803, 815
(C.C. Ohio 1894); Lake Erie & W. Ry. Co. v. Bailey, 61 F. 494, 496 (C.C. Ind. 1893).
44. See United States v. Agler, 62 F. 824, 825 (C.C.D. Ind. 1894).
45. See Fisher v. Baker, 203 U.S. 174 (1906).
46. Id. at 179–80.
47. NOAH WEBSTER, WEBSTER’S REVISED UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1489 (1913).
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explained more fully below,48 the instrumental definition has eclipsed
the descriptive definition. This Article argues that the dormant,
descriptive sphere of “terrorism” should be revived.
B.

Terrorism as a Separate Category of Legal Harm

The meanings of “terror” aside, it may not be self-evident why
federal law should recognize a separate category of harm called
“terrorism.” We may all agree that a simple state of fear does not, by
itself, give rise to a cognizable legal harm. For someone to
intentionally spook another and generate a discernible emotional
condition in another similarly would not be seen as something worthy
of regulation by law.49 Every emotive artistic performance, bad
break-up, or game of peak-a-boo would otherwise result in litigation.
As a result, a state of fear alone, or a calculated attempt to cause fear,
may not warrant the law’s involvement.
On the other hand, independent harms that cause fear may
implicate the law. Battery, for example, constitutes a physical harm
to the victim and the nature of assault and battery50 is such that a state
of fear, and intentional transmission of fear, is a necessary incident to
the physical harm.51 Rape represents a significant intrusion of bodily
integrity52 that not only ignores consent and violates the victim
physically and emotionally, but induces fear and is designed to

48. See infra Part II.A.
49. An exception is perhaps the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress,
though the bar to make such a claim is quite high. “To succeed on a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress in Maryland,” for example, “a plaintiff
must demonstrate that the defendant intentionally or recklessly engaged in extreme
and outrageous conduct that caused the plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distress.”
Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965) (“Liability has been found only where the conduct has been
so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible
bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a
civilized community.”).
50. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (1965) (“An actor is subject to
liability to another for battery if (a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive
contact with the person of the other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension
of such a contact, and (b) a harmful contact with the person of the other directly or
indirectly results.”); see also id. § 18(a) (“An actor is subject to liability to another for
battery if (a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person
of the other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such a contact, and (b)
an offensive contact with the person of the other directly or indirectly results.”).
51. See State v. Hale, 9 N.C. (2 Hawks) 582, 584 (1823) (“An assault and battery
. . . is injurious to the citizens at large by its breach of the peace, by the terror and
alarm it excites, by the disturbance of that social order which it is the primary object
of the law to maintain . . . .”).
52. See 10 U.S.C. § 920(a) (2012) (defining rape).
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generate that fear.53
Premeditated murder—because of its
preconceived, planned character and deadly results54—may chill
others in and around the community where the killing occurs.55 Such
a murder may send a negative message to others in that community or
affiliated with the victim.56 These crimes are what Robert Nozick
would call “public wrongs” because they instill fear not only in
victims, but in non-victims as well.57
Even though these crimes—battery, rape, and premeditated
murder—cross the line into what is illegal, and even though they each
may create fear and/or are calculated to cause fear, they do not fall
within the ordinary meaning of “terrorism.” In other words, there is
something qualitatively different from these “harm plus terror”
crimes and what constitutes “terrorism.”
That additional, distinguishing characteristic of “terrorism” may be
scale.58 An individual battery, rape, or premeditated killing, may
inflict significant harm, but may be seen nonetheless as a more
discrete attack or incident whose affect on others is limited.59 An act
of terrorism, in contrast, has more immediate, direct targets, and has a
wider impact both in physical and psychic terms.60 The line between

53. See, e.g., Samuel H. Pillsbury, Crimes Against the Heart: Recognizing the
Wrongs of Forced Sex, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 845, 885 n.123 (2002) (noting the
powerful testimony of a rape victim on the “sheer fear and terror” resulting from a
sexual attack).
54. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 550 (4th ed. 2006)
(providing that some courts distinguish premeditated murder as “a ‘cold-blooded’
killing, i.e., a homicide committed after calm and careful reflection by the
wrongdoer”).
55. See Christopher J. Meade, Reading Death Sentences: The Narrative
Construction of Capital Punishment, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 732, 742 (1996) (“Murders
spawn a feeling of chaos which instills fear in a community.”).
56. See Jennifer M. Smith, Note, An International Hit Job: Prosecuting
Organized Crime Acts as Crimes Against Humanity, 97 GEO. L.J. 1111, 1144 (2009)
(“Hits and other violence committed by organized crime groups . . . send a message
of intimidation to the broader community . . . .”)
57. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 67 (1974).
58. See Judith Resnik, Detention, the War on Terror, and the Federal Courts, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 579, 587 (2010) (“The context of terror has distinctive features,
including [an almost unimaginable] scale of harm . . . .”); William F. Zieske,
Demystifying the USA PATRIOT Act, 92 ILL. B.J. 82, 83 (2004) (“[I]t is inherently
difficult to draw a definitive line between terrorism and all other crime, other than by
the scale of impact.”).
59. This is not to dismiss or underestimate, by any means, the significant injuries
that these harms may impose on an individual or others.
60. See Stephen P. Marks, Branding the “War on Terrorism”: Is there a “New
Paradigm” of International Law?, 14 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 71, 73–74 (2006) (“[T]he
nature of terrorism . . . is [that it is] successful to the extent that relatively small-scale
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an individualized attack and one that constitutes terrorism may be
difficult to draw, though it may be comfortably said that an assault in
a bar falls short while a bombing of the same bar crosses that line.
The wider psychic impact of terrorism may be particularly
heightened because terrorism is random; indeed, Cyrille Begorre-Bret
describes terrorism as a “‘blind’ violence because it . . . strikes at
random, innocent people.”61 Terrorist incidents are systematic in a
narrow sense—for example, the perpetrators may target individuals
who are eating at a restaurant in a busy tourist district, working in a
landmark building, or flying on a large airplane. But the targets are
not individually selected, and are indistinguishable from each other as
far as the offenders are concerned. An assault victim may have been
selected due to some escalating disagreement in a bar. A terrorist
event, by contrast, reflects indiscriminate targeting of victims.62
Political philosopher Michael Walzer, for example, defines terrorism
simply as “the random murder of innocent people.”63 The fear that an
act of terrorism generates is therefore larger, because the victim
literally could be anyone—anyone who happened to be dining at a
restaurant in that popular area, anyone working in a notable building,
and anyone who happened to be flying.64 As the particular victims are
not specially targeted, the sense that “it could have been me” is
shared more broadly and widens the circle of fear.65
harm can produce large scale fear and attract [greater attention] than all other causes
of death . . . .”).
61. Cyrille Begorre-Bret, The Definition of Terrorism and the Challenge of
Relativism, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1987, 1996 (2006).
62. See id.; see also Kevin J. Greene, Terrorism as Impermissible Political
Violence: An International Law Framework, 16 VT. L. REV. 461, 477 (1992) (“[A]
feature that distinguishes terrorism from other types of political violence ‘is the
willful and calculated choice of innocents as targets . . . . [T]errorists choose to attack
weak and defenseless civilians . . . anyone in fact except soldiers, if they can avoid it.
Civilians, then are the key to the terrorists’ strategy.’” (quoting Benjamin Netanyahu,
Defining Terrorism, in TERRORISM: HOW THE WEST CAN WIN 7, 9–10 (Benjamin
Netanyahu ed., 1986))).
63. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 198 (4th ed. 2000).
64. These examples already point to the relevance of space, a point clarified infra
Part III.
65. Yehuda Amichai’s poem, The Diameter of a Bomb, speaks to the impact of
mass violence:
The diameter of the bomb was thirty centimeters
and the diameter of its effective range about seven meters,
with four dead and eleven wounded.
And around these in a larger circle
of pain and time, two hospitals are scattered
and one graveyard. But the young woman
who was buried in the city she came from,

92

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLI

An interesting question is whether a serial perpetrator may be
considered a “terrorist” due to the impact of his or her actions in the
aggregate, where each individual act may not itself rise to the level of
terrorism. A serial rapist or murderer may wreak more physical and
psychic harm on a community than the perpetrator of a single
incident with one-off targets. To use a different example, the Ku
Klux Klan’s behavior—including organizing lynching, inciting
violence, and intimidating African-Americans—has been said to
constitute a protracted “reign of terror.”66
A burning of a
predominantly African-American church is a significant crime, one
that causes fright and that is calculated to cause fright; the waves of
fright extend beyond the four corners of the parish’s property to all
African-Americans in the neighborhood or proximity, and reaches
effectively all African-Americans.67 But a single church burning is not
considered terrorism; the collective campaign of intimidation and
violence, however, may be.68 In any case, federal hate crimes
legislation, which makes it unlawful for anyone “to attempt to cause
bodily injury to any person, because of the [person’s] actual or

at a distance of more than a hundred kilometers,
enlarges the circle considerably,
and the solitary man mourning her death
at the distant shores of a country far across the sea
includes the entire world in the circle.
And I won’t even mention the crying of orphans
that reaches up to the throne of God and
beyond, making
a circle with no end and no God.
Yehuda Amichai, The Diameter of a Bomb, available at http://allpoetry.com/
poem/8513183-The-Diameter-Of-The-Bomb-by-Yehuda_Amichai (last visited Nov.
7, 2013).
66. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 353 (2003).
67. See generally Troy A. Scotting, Hate Crimes and the Need for Stronger
Federal Legislation, 34 AKRON L. REV. 853, 864 (2001) (“[H]ate crimes are seen as
‘message crimes,’ in effect, sending ‘a message that members of a certain
group . . . are not wanted in a particular neighborhood, community, workplace, or
college campus.’” (quoting Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 1998: Testimony on H.R.
3081 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1998) (testimony of Jack
McDevitt, Professor, Northeastern Univ.))); id. (“When the victim is attacked
because of an immutable characteristic, members of the target community who share
the characteristic perceive it ‘as an attack on themselves directly and individually.’”
(quoting FREDERICK M. LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE 42 (1999))); id. (“This creates
a feeling among target community members that any one of them could be a victim of
similar violence.”).
68. This possibility appears to be consistent with the view, expressed by noted
feminist legal scholar Catherine MacKinnon, that violence against women, a “daily
war,” is terrorism. See Catherine MacKinnon, Women’s September 11th: Rethinking
International Law of Conflict, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 19 (2006).
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perceived race [or] color,”69 and federal civil rights laws, which make
it unlawful for anyone to conspire to deprive another of constitutional
rights on the basis of race,70 not to mention arson and related state
offenses, may nonetheless enable society and the government to
punish strongly this systemic mistreatment of African-Americans.
These other avenues of redress require us again to question why
terrorism as a stand-alone offense is necessary.
To take a more recent example, John Muhammad and Lee Boyd
Malvo, known as the “D.C. snipers,” killed thirteen people over a
three-week period in the Washington, D.C. area.71 They apparently,
according to Malvo, sought to “terrorize” the nation.72 They were
formally charged in Virginia with “an act of terrorism,” among other
things.73 Given the number of victims, the number of potential
victims, and the extended period over which the perpetrators
randomly killed individuals, “terrorism” may seem appropriate under
this “mosaic theory” of terrorism.74 Nevertheless, the localized nature
of the shootings (their limit to the D.C. region) cuts against the
application of the term. In any case, premeditated murder would still
cover these crimes.75
Drilling down on what constitutes “terrorism” still does not
adequately respond to the question of why a separate legal harm of
“terrorism” needs to exist. For example, to the extent that terrorism
is a way to challenge political policies or programs,76 such means are
clearly unlawful under any doctrine. The eight German saboteurs
who buried their uniforms in the sand upon arriving on the shores of

69. 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1) (2012).
70. See 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (2006).
71. See Larry O’Dell, D.C. Sniper Lee Boyd Malvo Wants Life Sentences Tossed,
WASH. TIMES, June 27, 2013, www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jun/27/dc-snipermalvo-wants-life-sentences-tossed/.
72. See C. Benjamin Ford, Malvo Says Pair Planned Bombings, GAZETTE.NET
(May 24, 2006), http://ww2.gazette.net/stories/052406/germnew193052_31939.shtml /.
73. See Muhammad v. Commonwealth, 619 S.E.2d 16, 30 (Va. 2005).
74. See generally Orin Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111
MICH. L. REV. 311, 313–14 (2012) (explaining that, under the Fourth Amendment,
the mosaic theory holds that “searches can be analyzed as a collective sequence of
steps rather than as individual steps”); id. at 314 (pursuant to the theory, courts are
“aggregating conduct rather than looking to discrete steps”).
75. John Muhammad, the only adult of the two, was executed and would have
been executed for the capital murder charge, irrespective of the terrorism charge. See
Muhammad, 619 S.E.2d at 30 (noting that Muhammad was convicted of the two
capital murder charges, only one of which was premised on terrorism).
76. See 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (2012) (“[T]he term ‘terrorism’ means
premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant
targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents . . . .”).
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Long Island and Florida, and who were on a mission to destroy
American military capabilities and attack civilian stores, may have
been engaged in instrumental terrorism.77 Yet their actions already
are violations of the laws of war.78 Accordingly, why the need for
terrorism? To take another recent example, the Tsarnaev brothers
detonated two bombs near the finish line of the Boston Marathon,
apparently in violent protest of American mistreatment of Muslims.79
The surviving brother was charged with several offenses, perhaps the
most serious of which were using of a weapon of mass destruction and
the malicious destruction of property resulting in death,80 which both
potentially carry the death penalty.81 If sufficient charges aside from
terrorism exist, is not “terrorism” as a separate cognizable harm
unnecessary or superfluous?
The scale, random nature, and extended sphere of fear are
attributes of terrorism, but still are not wholly satisfactory ways to
separate terrorism from other crimes. There are two reasons for
including terrorism in federal law; the first is social and the second
legal. First, “terrorism” and “terrorist” are powerful social terms that
signify society’s alienation of the perpetrator, indicating that the
perpetrator is worthy of no other identity than that of “terrorist.”82
To label someone a “terrorist” is to socially exile that person.
Perhaps no other word in the current American lexicon carries as
much power to effectuate society’s interest in marginalizing the
perpetrator; “murderer,” or “sex offender,” for example, also declare
society’s revulsion as to the perpetrator, but perhaps not to the
degree of “terrorist.” For Tsarnaev, being labeled a “user of a
weapon of mass destruction” or “malicious destructor of property
resulting in death” does not nearly have the same weight or social
utility as “terrorist.”
This theory on the relationship between terrorism and identity is
not altogether new. Prime Minister of India Dr. Manmohan Singh
stated after the 2005 London subway bombings, for example, “I do

77. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1942).
78. See id. at 12.
79. See Deborah Feyerick et al., Boston Bomb Suspect Pleads Not Guilty, CNN
(July 11, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/10/us/boston-bombing-case.
80. Indictment, United States v. Tsarnaev, No. 1:13CR10200, 2013 WL 3215742
(D. Mass. June 27, 2013).
81. See 18 U.S.C. § 2332a(a)(4) (2012); id. § 844(i).
82. See BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM 23 (2006) (“‘[T]errorism’ is a
pejorative term.”) Hodgson & Tadros, supra note 15, at 497 (noting that “terrorism”
has a “condemnatory effect” in that it marks out an importantly distinctive wrong
that has widespread public recognition).
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believe that terrorism has no religion, terrorists have no religion and
that they are a friend of no religion. No religion in the world
preaches atrocities against innocent men, women and children . . . .”83
Similarly, following failed terrorist plots in London and Glasgow, Dr.
Singh said, “A terrorist is a terrorist and has no religion or
community.”84 Lieutenant Brian Murphy (retired), the first law
enforcement officer to respond to the Oak Creek shooting, said of the
perpetrator, “[H]e was at a temple, shooting at worshippers, old men,
women, and children. Who does that? Who really does that? He
was not a human being at that point. He was less than human.”85 To
label an individual as a “terrorist” is to therefore strip the perpetrator
of any other human identity and brand him as highly offensive of
society’s most basic norms and rules. Further, as Attorney General
Holder said in Oak Creek, “this community witnessed the very worst
of human kind.”86
Social science on criminal defendants makes clear that informal
social control—the practice of guiding individual behavior through
interactions with society—helps reduce antisocial thoughts and
actions, and in this respect helps an individual become a regular, nonoffending part of mainstream society.87 Social science further
establishes that concepts of identity play a critical role in the postoffense development of a criminal defendant.88 In branding an
individual a “terrorist,” we may be indicating that the individual is no
longer deserving of society’s informal support and that the starting
point for any identity transformation of the individual must be the
lowly and stigmatized identity of “terrorist.”
Second, to make this social punishment effective and available to
prosecutors, terrorism must be codified in law.89 “Terrorism” as a

83. Joint Press Conference Between Tony Blair and Manmohan Singh, NAT’L
ARCHIVES (Sept. 8, 2005), http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20050908065251/
number10.gov.uk/page8152.
84. Emily Wax, Indian Doctors Fear Bomb Plot Backlash, WASH. POST, July 6,
2007, at A10.
85. Cal Fussman, Lieutenant Brian Murphy: What I’ve Learned, ESQUIRE (Dec.
27, 2012), http://www.esquire.com/features/what-ive-learned/meaning-of-life-2013/
brian-murphy-sikh-temple-shooting-0113.
86. Holder, supra note 6, at 2.
87. See generally Robert J. Sampson et al., Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A
Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy, 277 SCI. 918 (1997).
88. See John H. Laub & Robert J. Sampson, Understanding Desistance from
Crime, 28 CRIME & JUST. 1, 12 (2001) (describing desistance as “a social transition
that entails identity transformation . . . from an offender to a nonoffender”).
89. See Hodgson & Tadros, supra note 15, at 497 (noting that “terrorism” is
designed to “trigger[] the use of terrorism law”).
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legal concept reflects the great social disapproval of the underlying
conduct and identifies violence that is in the highest level of harms to
society and mankind. For example, William Blackstone noted that “it
is but reasonable that among crimes of different natures those should
be most severely punished, which are the most destructive of the
public safety and happiness.”90 Terrorism is in that tier. As one
commentator writes, “States consider terrorism . . . a heinous crime
on the order of a crime against humanity . . . .”91
Criminal laws are all supported, as they must be, by the purposes of
criminal punishment. These are retribution (a form of social
vengeance directed at the offender), just deserts (part of the bargain
in the social contract wherein an individual who breaks the law
consents to and is due punishment), deterrence (a social message that
the offense will not be tolerated and thus should not be committed by
others), incapacitation (a form of social control by removing the
offender from society), and rehabilitation (a form of social investment
in the improvement of the offender).92 Because of its heinous nature,
terrorism may be a crime that we concede to be supported primarily
by retributive reasons.93
In short, “terror” historically has meant that which causes fright
(the descriptive definition) and that which is calculated to cause fright
(the instrumental definition).94 Though “terrorism” shares these fearbased elements in common with other recognized crimes, terrorism
may be distinguished in part by its scale, its indiscriminate nature, and
the wider universe of individuals it potentially impacts,95 in contrast
with incidents that target particular people or are localized. As an

90. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 488 (1993) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
91. Kelly A. Gable, Cyber-Apocalypse Now: Securing the Internet Against
Cyberterrorism and Using Universal Jurisdiction as a Deterrent, 43 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 57, 106 (2010); see also Christopher L. Blakesley, Ruminations on
Terrorism and Anti-Terrorism Law and Literature, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1041, 1110
(2003) (“Crimes against humanity and terrorism are crimes of the first order. They
represent, along with genocide, the worst we mortals do to each other; that is to
say . . . to ourselves.”).
92. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2012) (listing the purposes of criminal sentencing).
93. See Laura K. Donohue, In the Name of National Security: U.S.
Counterterrorist Measures, 1960–2000, 13 TERRORISM AND POL. VIOLENCE 15 (2001)
(“Let terrorists beware that when the rules of international behavior are violated, our
policy will be one of swift and effective retribution.”); cf. Note, Responding to
Terrorism: Crime, Punishment, and War, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1217 (2002) (suggesting
that America’s response to terrorism after 9/11 may be supported by joint interests in
retribution and incapacitation).
94. See supra notes 21–31 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 55–61 and accompanying text.
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initial matter, terrorism, unique in its scale, randomness, and impact,
should be a separate category of harm because it allows society to
alienate, and the law to apply a particularly robust set of laws against,
the perpetrators of such especially harmful actions.
II. FEDERAL TERRORISM LAW
A. Federal Definition of Terrorism
Part I was intended to provide some conceptual background on
what should constitute terrorism. This Part is designed to address
what counts as terrorism according to federal law. A single or static
definition of terrorism is difficult to pin down,96 a task complicated by
the numerous definitions of and references to terrorism in federal
law.97 An overarching principle in federal terrorism statutes may be
found nonetheless: as explained more fully below, federal law
generally requires that the act of violence be politically or socially
motivated to be an act of terrorism.
One federal statute, for example, provides that “the term
‘terrorism’ means premeditated, politically motivated violence
perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or
clandestine agents.”98 Another states that “the term ‘Federal crime of
terrorism’ means an [unlawful] offense that . . . is calculated to
influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or
coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct,”99 and still
another federal statute states that “international terrorism” means
violent or dangerous criminal activities that “appear to be
intended . . . to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; to influence
the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or to affect

96. See Sudha Setty, What’s in a Name? How Nations Define Terrorism Ten
Years After 9/11, 33 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1, 6–7 n.12 (2011) (referring to scholars’
attempts to settle on a single definition of “terrorism” where a consensus, both
internationally and domestically, on its meaning does not exist); Chris Good, What It
Means to Call It ‘Terrorism’, ABC NEWS (Apr. 17, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/
blogs/politics/2013/04/what-it-means-to-call-it-terrorism/ (quoting a former FBI
counterterrorism official as saying, “There’s a number of different definitions for
‘terrorism.’ There’s the academic definition, and there are the legal definitions, and
then there’s the one that’s used by the FBI, which kind of straddles both.”).
97. See Setty, supra note 96, at 18 n.56 (citing Nicholas J. Perry, The Numerous
Federal Legal Definitions of Terrorism: The Problem of Too Many Grails, 30 J.
LEGIS. 249, 249–50 (2004)) (explaining that there are “twenty-two definitions of
terrorism under U.S. federal law”).
98. 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (2012).
99. 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5) (2012).
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the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or
kidnapping.”100
Accordingly, the most basic definition of terrorism in federal law,
as a federal agency pointed out in a post-9/11 memorandum, is that
“terrorism”
“means
criminal
acts
by
individuals
or
groups . . . motivated by political or social agendas.”101 Many scholars
and public figures seem to agree with this definition. Bruce Hoffman,
for example, suggests that terrorism is “the deliberate creation and
exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the
pursuit of political change.”102 Anne-Marie Slaughter and William
Burke-White likewise contend that “[t]error . . . is spread for a
purpose, generally to advance or publicize a cause or to undermine
public order as part of a political, ethnic, or religious struggle.”103
Phillip Heymann writes that terrorism is “violence conducted as part
of a political strategy by a subnational group or secret agents of a
foreign state.”104 For his part, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu finds that “[t]errorism is the deliberate and systematic
assault on civilians to inspire fear for political ends.”105 Thus, the
federal government, supported by scholars and others, sees terrorism
as predicated upon a particular motive.
Federal conceptions of “terrorism” tend to emphasize not only
political or social intent but also an interest in intimidating or
coercing a civilian population. The White House’s National Security
Strategy, for example, notes that “[t]he goal of those who perpetrate
terrorist attacks is in part to sow fear.”106 Similarly, speaking on the
sentencing of a man for terrorism violations, a federal prosecutor
announced that an act that “creates panic, chaos, and fear . . . is the

100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. § 2331(1).
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 13, at 1.
HOFFMAN, supra note 82, at 40.
Anne Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, An International
Constitutional Moment, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 12 (2002).
104. PHILLIP B. HEYMANN, TERRORISM AND AMERICA: A COMMONSENSE
STRATEGY FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 6 (1998).
105. BENJAMIN NETANYAHU, FIGHTING TERRORISM: HOW DEMOCRACIES CAN
DEFEAT DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS 8 (1997).
106. THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 22 (2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.p
df; see also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., THE SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY OF COMBATING TERRORISM 7 (2003), available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/pcast-03-scitechterrorism.pdf
(referring to the “fear and anxiety that terrorists seek to instill”).
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definition of terrorism.”107 This intimidation or coercion strand of
terrorism is but part of a federal definition of terrorism that is
exclusively instrumental.
This is not to suggest that the descriptive understanding of
terrorism—in which “terror” means a state of fear or fright—has been
wholly pushed out of the public consciousness. It is not uncommon
for political leaders to walk the line between the descriptive and
instrumental view, careful to use the former in order to benefit from
its weight and import without wading into the latter, technical area.108
In recent months, American leaders have chastised individuals for
“terrorizing” a community or the American people without claiming
to make, or being held to, a definitive legal statement that an incident
is an “act of terrorism.”109 For example, the morning after the
Aurora, Colorado movie theater shooting, President Obama
pondered why anyone would “terrorize their fellow human beings
like this.”110 Rhetorical maneuvers aside, it is clear that the formal,
federal definition of terrorism requires a discernible political or social
motive before it comes into play.
B.

Application of the Federal Definition to Recent Events

It may be helpful to see how the federal definition of terrorism
applies to the four examples of recent mass violence briefly
summarized at the outset of this Article. First, the shooting in
Aurora, Colorado, was aimed at a large number of people (i.e., the
theater was packed for the premiere of a popular movie),111
indiscriminate (i.e., Holmes did not seem to have any specific targets

107. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Zajac Sentenced to 35 Years in Federal
Prison in Connection with Explosion at Salt Lake Library 2 (Apr. 14, 2011), available

at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/ut/news/2011/Zajac%20sentenced%20for%20library%20
bombing.pdf.
108. See Abdullah, supra note 18.
109. President Obama is apparently aware of the need to be deliberate in one’s
word choice. As he famously said during the 2008 campaign, “Don’t tell me words
don’t matter.” See Michael Luo, On Health Care, Affordability and
Comprehensiveness, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/22/
us/politics/22check.html.
110. Eyder Peralta, President Obama: ‘Such Violence, Such Evil Is Senseless; It’s
Beyond Reason’, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (July 20, 2012, 11:14 AM), http://www.npr.org/
blogs/thetwo-way/2012/07/20/157101106/president-obama-such-violence-such-evil-issenseless-its-beyond-reason.
111. See Erica Goode et al., Before Gunfire, Hints of ‘Bad News’, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 27, 2012, at A1 (noting that the movie theater was “sold out”).
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in mind and was shooting individuals in the theater randomly),112 and
premeditated (i.e., Holmes was heavily armed and carefully planned
his attack for months, first filling the theater with smoke before
peppering the crowd with bullets).113
But the attack had no political or social agenda. Holmes did not
express, nor is there any meaningful evidence Holmes intended to
effectuate, political or social change through violence.114 Instead, it
seems that Holmes was a disaffected young man,115 and the requisite
motive was lacking. Thus, the terrorism designation would not
apply—indeed, Holmes has not been charged with terrorism in
federal court.116
Due to the reprehensible nature of the shooting, some were
outraged at Holmes117 and pondered whether the shooting should be

112. See Dana Ford, Colorado Theater Shooting Suspect Offers to Plead Guilty,
CNN (Mar. 28, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/27/us/colorado-theater-shooting
(“Witnesses who spoke to CNN said the gunman roamed the theater, shooting
randomly as people tried to scramble away or cowered between seats.”).
113. See Andre Tartar, Police: Colorado Shooter Planned Attack With
‘Calculation and Deliberation’, N.Y. MAG. (July 22, 2012), http://nymag.com/daily/
intelligencer/2012/07/police-colorado-shooting-was-premeditated.html.
Aurora Police Chief Dan Oates now says there is clear evidence that the
rampage was planned with ‘calculation and deliberation.’ He points to the
“high volume of deliveries” Holmes received over the past four months
(including 6,000 rounds of ammunition and a bulletproof vest purchased
online) and the fact that he spent two months amassing a small arsenal—
consisting of a semi-automatic assault rifle, which jammed during the attack,
two pistols, and a shotgun—from local stores.

Id.
114. At most, it seems, Holmes may have gone on his rampage in response to his
academic shortcomings. See John Ingold et al., DA: Holmes Made Threat at CU at
Same Time He Failed, Bought Guns, DENVER POST, Aug. 24, 2012, http://www.
denverpost.com/ci_21384695/prosecutor-alleged-theater-shooter-holmes-bannedfrom-cu-june-threats.
115. See Nancy Dillon & James McShane, James Holmes, Aurora Shooting
Suspect, Was Grad School Dropout and Loner, Say Neighbors, N.Y. DAILY NEWS,
July 21, 2012, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/james-holmes-aurorashooting-suspect-med-school-dropout-loner-neighbors-article1.1118501#ixzz2ZbWAXi2q.
116. See Madison Gray, James Holmes Charged with 142 Counts, Including FirstDegree Murder, in Colorado Theater Shooting, TIME (July 30, 2012),
http://newsfeed.time.com/2012/07/30/james-holmes-charged-with-142-countsincluding-first-degree-murder-in-colo-theater-shooting/#ixzz2ZbX1h9ce
(“Holmes . . . was formally charged with 24 counts of first-degree murder and 116
counts of attempted murder . . . as well as one charge of using a crime enhancer and
one of possessing an explosive device.”).
117. See, e.g., Mark Brown, Some See Accused Killer James Holmes as the Face of
Evil, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 23, 2012, http://www.suntimes.com/news/brown/13957656452/some-see-accused-killer-james-holmes-as-the-face-of-evil.html.
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considered terrorism.118 Calling the shooting an act of terrorism
would allow the social alienation and legal consequences to flow from
this designation. In truth, following the rampage, I argued that “the
crime Mr. Holmes is accused of—the cold, calculated shooting of
innocents in a movie theater—qualifies as terrorism and its
perpetrator as a terrorist.”119 These and similar social judgments
aside, federal law would not hold that Holmes committed an act of
terrorism because there was no evidence of a cognizable political or
social motive.
Next, turning to the shooting of worshippers at a Sikh temple in
Oak Creek, Wisconsin, the number of potential targets was high (i.e.,
the congregation has approximately 400 members).120 Further, Page
shot in cold blood six individuals in an indiscriminate fashion (i.e., not
targeting anyone specifically, but gunning down anyone present in the
temple or on temple grounds).121 In addition, Page reportedly had
visited the temple before,122 suggesting premeditation.
But Page’s motive is still unknown,123 preventing any firm
conclusion that the incident was motivated by a political or social
purpose, a necessary element of “terrorism” under existing federal
law.124 As the Oak Creek Chief of Police admitted, “I don’t know that
we’ll ever know, because when he died [from a self-inflicted gunshot

118. See Greenwald, supra note 14.
119. Dawinder S. Sidhu, Colorado Shooter Was a Terrorist, BALT. SUN, July 24,
2012,
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/bs-ed-colorado-shootingterrorism-20120724,0,285198.story.
120. See Eric Toner, Sikhs Grieve After Deadly Temple Shooting, NAT’L PUB.
RADIO (Aug. 06, 2012, 3:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/08/06/158232623/sikhsgrieve-after-deadly-temple-shooting.
121. See Mike Lillis, Dem Lawmaker Wants the White House to Investigate
Violence Against Sikhs, HILL (Aug. 9, 2012), http://thehill.com/homenews/house/
243033-dem-wants-wh-to-investigate-violence-against-sikhs (noting that Page “began
firing, silently and indiscriminately.”)
122. See Henry Rosoff, Southern Poverty Law Center Releases Report on Sikh
Temple Gunman, FOX6NOW.COM (Nov. 27, 2012), http://fox6now.com/
2012/11/27/southern-poverty-law-center-releases-report-on-sikh-temple-gunman
(“Page reportedly visited the Sikh Temple at least once before the shooting.”).
123. This paragraph and the remainder of this subpart are based, in part, on
Dawinder S. Sidhu, Lessons on Terrorism and “Mistaken Identity,” from Oak Creek,
With a Coda on the Boston Marathon Bombings, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 76,
79–80, 82–83, 88 (2013).
124. Indeed, speaking at a hearing on domestic terrorism and hate crimes
convened by the Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights & Human
Rights, a Department of Homeland Security official acknowledged that the Oak
Creek shooting “was carried out by an individual with a history of involvement in the
white supremacist extremist movement, although his motives remain unknown.”
MCALLISTER, supra note 10, at 6.
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wound], . . . what his motive was or what he was thinking [died with
him].”125 It is true that Page, the shooter, was an avowed white
supremacist and had invited likeminded individuals to “get involved
and become active.”126 While Page’s involvement with the organized
white supremacy movement may provide some measure of
circumstantial evidence of the requisite motive,127 this constitutionally
protected speech and association does not automatically convert his
behavior, however violent, into actionable bias or ideologically
motivated conduct.128 The Federal Bureau of Investigation itself
reported, after its investigation, that “[n]o evidence was uncovered to
conclude this attack was directed or facilitated by any white
supremacist group.”129 The mass shooting had a large number of
potential targets, was indiscriminate, and was apparently
premeditated, which all cut in favor of the terrorism label. But the
absence of an identifiable motive prevents the terrorism designation
from applying. Attorney General Holder’s comment, made at a
memorial for the Oak Creek victims, that “what happened” was “an
act of terrorism,”130 is difficult to square with this straightforward
analysis.131
Moving on to Newtown, the shooter, Adam Lanza, shot his mother
in the head four times at home, damaged his computer hard drive in
125. Elaine Quijano, Question of Motive Remains in Sikh Temple Shooting, CBS
NEWS (Aug. 7, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18563_162-57488654/question-ofmotive-remains-in-sikh-temple-shooting/ (internal quotation marks omitted).
126. Scott Bauer & Todd Richmond, Gunman in Sikh Temple Attack Was White
Supremacist, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 6, 2012, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/gunmansikh-temple-attack-was-white-supremacist.
127. See United States v. Skillman, 922 F.2d 1370, 1373–74 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding
individual’s interest in “skinheads” was relevant in that it “tended” to show “racial
animus and that he might act on his beliefs”).
128. See United States v. Magleby, 241 F.3d 1306, 1316 (10th Cir. 2001) (noting
concern that admitting testimony would amount to “permitting the factfinder to
conclude that the defendant was guilty by association”); United States v. J.H.H., 22
F.3d 821, 829 (8th Cir. 1994) (expressing concern that testimony attempting to link
skinhead status with specific intent “comes dangerously close to permitting the
factfinder to adjudge appellants guilty by association”). See generally NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 920 (1982) (“For liability to be imposed by
reason of association alone, it is necessary to establish that the group itself possessed
unlawful goals and that the individual held a specific intent to further those illegal
aims.”); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 185–86 (1972) (“[T]he Court has consistently
disapproved governmental action imposing criminal sanctions or denying rights and
privileges solely because of a citizen’s association with an unpopular organization.”).
129. Oak Creek Sikh Temple Shooting Investigation Conclusion, FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION (Nov. 20, 2012), http://www.fbi.gov/milwaukee/press-releases/2012/
oak-creek-sikh-temple-shooting-investigation-conclusion.
130. Holder, supra note 6, at 2.
131. See Sidhu, supra note 123, at 77–81.
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an apparent effort to foil investigators and cover his tracks, and then
proceeded to the elementary school where his mother volunteered,
killing twenty-six people, including twenty children, with a
semiautomatic weapon.132
Lanza shot innocent individuals
indiscriminately and did so with premeditation.133 The shooting
arguably warrants the “terrorism” designation under law and the
strong social disapproval that the “terrorism” label necessary
provokes, especially as Lanza shot each of the children multiple
times, with some children shot as many as eleven times.134
The absence of motive, however, blocks the legal and social
consequences from attending this case. In a Washington Post article
aptly entitled “A Frustrating Search for Motive in Newtown
Shootings,” a Connecticut police department spokesperson admitted
that “we don’t have any smoking gun to say this is why it occurred.”135
Accordingly, under prevailing federal law, Lanza’s actions would not
be deemed “terrorism.”
Finally, and most recently, Boston. The bombings could have
killed scores of individuals (i.e., there were hundreds of individuals
crossing, or watching, the finish line).136 The bombings were

132. See Michael S. Schmidt, Killer’s Mother Was Shot 4 Times, Official Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 18, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/19/nyregion/lanzas-mothershot-4-times-in-head-medical-examiner-says.html (describing these facts, noting that
Lanza’s “path of devastation seemed coldly calculated”).
133. See id.; see also Miriam Hernandez, Psychologist Looks at Conn. Shooter’s
Mindset, ABC NEWS (Dec. 14, 2012) http://abclocal.go.com/kabc/story?section=
news/national_world&id=8921128 (quoting a forensic psychologist as saying, “It was
a calculated, premeditated act of murder on this particular individual’s part to inflict
harm, not only on his mother but to innocent children as well.”).
134. See James Barron, Pupils Were All Shot Multiple Times With a
Semiautomatic, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2012, at A1.
135. Marc Fisher et al., A Frustrating Search for Motive in Newtown Shootings,
WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/a-frustratingsearch-for-motive-in-the-madness/2012/12/22/1cbe1cbc-4956-11e2-820e17eefac2f939_story.html (noting that the search for motive in this case was
particularly complicated because, “[f]or a young man who spent most of his waking
hours at a computer, he appears to have left behind an astonishingly small online
footprint”).
136. See 2013 Boston Marathon Statistics, BOSTON ATHLETIC ASS’N,
http://raceday.baa.org/statistics.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2013) (showing that 17,600
people completed the 2013 Boston Marathon). “[T]ens of thousands . . . line the race
course to cheer on the runners and enjoy the race.” Indictment, United States v.
Tsarnaev, No. 1:13CR10200, 2013 WL 3215742, ¶ 3 (D. Mass. June 27, 2013). Over
200 were injured in the bomb blasts. See Reconstructing the Scene of the Boston
Marathon Bombing, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2013/04/17/us/caught-in-the-blast-at-the-boston-marathon.html.
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indiscriminate (i.e., no specific individuals were targeted).137 There
can be no doubt that the bombings were premeditated, as they
necessarily required advance planning and deliberation.138
The day after the attack, before we even knew who was responsible
for the bombings, let alone why the bombings were committed,
President Obama declared the attack “an act of terrorism.”139 As
terrorism under federal law must be predicated upon the motive of
the perpetrator, President Obama’s statement in the absence of any
knowledge of perpetrators or the motive was, at the time, an
improper statement of law.
Subsequently, of course, it was discovered that the bombings were
the work of the Tsarnaev brothers.140 Moreover, and importantly,
news reports indicated that the bombings were the brothers’ response
to alleged American mistreatment of Muslims. To erase any doubt as
to the purpose of the bombings, the surviving brother, Dzhokhar,
scribbled the following on the inside of the boat as he laid in the
backyard of an area home:
The U.S. Government is killing our innocent civilians . . . . I can’t
stand to see such evil unpunished . . . .We Muslims are one body,
you hurt one you hurt us all . . . . Now I don’t like killing innocent
people it is forbidden in Islam but due to said [unintelligible] it is
allowed . . . . Stop killing our innocent people and we will stop.141

It would seem therefore that the requisite intent is present for
federal terrorism charges to apply to Tsarnaev. Curiously, however,
federal prosecutors have not charged Tsarnaev with committing an
act of terrorism.142
The Boston bombings highlight the inconsistent and perhaps
incoherent nature of terrorism’s definition in federal law and
application to incidents of mass violence. The President, without
knowledge of motive, makes a clear statement that the attack
137. See Editorial, In Boston, One Act of Evil, Thousands of Acts of Humanity,
BALT. SUN, Apr. 16, 2013, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-04-16/news/bs-edboston-marathon-bombing-20130416_1_boston-marathon-boston-globe-securityguard (referring to the “indiscriminate pain and cruelty” of the Boston Bombings).
138. See Mark Memmott & Eyder Peralta, Tsarnaev Charged: Suspected Boston
Bomber Accused of Using WMD, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Apr. 22, 2013),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2013/04/22/178369466/boston-bombingsmondays-developments (“FBI investigators said evidence shows [the incident] was a
coldly calculated attack.”); see also Indictment, Tsarnaev, No. 1:13CR10200, 2013
WL 3215742, ¶¶ 15–40.
139. See Landler, supra note 7.
140. Indictment, Tsarnaev, No. 1:13CR10200, 2013 WL 3215742, ¶¶ 23–27.
141. Id. ¶ 10.
142. See id. ¶¶ 11–154 (listing the thirty counts against Tsarnaev).
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constituted an act of terrorism, and when that motive is known, the
federal authorities fail to lodge any terrorism charges.143 At the same
time that the federal position was changing or evolving, the people
themselves were attempting to grapple with whether the terrorism
designation was appropriate in this instance.144 The need for clarity in
understanding when terrorism has occurred is therefore critical and
this need has been underscored by recent events and subsequent
uncertainties. The remainder of the Article discusses whether an
appreciation for space can bring us closer to a reliable and consistent
concept of terrorism.
III. A SPATIAL MODEL OF TERRORISM
A. The Relevance of Space
Context matters, as the Supreme Court has said many times and in
various doctrinal areas.145 This Part explains why the context of space
should matter in determining whether terrorism has taken place.
The notion that space is relevant in legal analysis is not new. This
notion is beyond the obvious realms of property (e.g., the legal right
to exclusive use of certain lands or water),146 privacy (e.g., shared
understandings of personal or spatial integrity),147 and extraterritorial

143. Compare Boston Bombings: Obama Condemns ‘Act of Terrorism’, supra note
12 (“President Barack Obama has condemned the twin bombing at the Boston
Marathon as a ‘terrorist act.’”), with Indictment, Tsarnaev, No. 1:13CR10200, 2013
WL 3215742, ¶¶ 11–154 (charges against the surviving Tsarnaev brother do not
include a charge of a terrorism offense).
144. See, e.g., Greenwald, supra note 14.
145. See, e.g., Caraco Pharm. Lab., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1681
(2012) (statutory interpretation); Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 433 n.16 (2010) (same); Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.
White, 548 U.S. 53, 69 (2006) (employment discrimination); Gonzales v. O Centro
Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 431 (2006) (religious freedom
and controlled substances); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 722–23 (2005)
(religious freedom in the penal environment); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327
(2004) (race-conscious admissions in higher education).
146. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot., 130 S.
Ct. 2592 (2010) (holding that private landowners did not have an exclusive right to a
new sand area created by the state on eroded beachfront).
147. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (holding that the
government’s placement of a global positioning device on a private vehicle
constituted a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); cf. Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people,
not places.”).
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jurisdiction (e.g., the applicability of legal provisions beyond areas
over which the United States has de jure sovereignty).148
In the First Amendment realm, for example, the extent to which an
individual’s speech is protected may depend on where he or she is
speaking. The Court has instructed, “To ascertain what limits, if any,
may be placed on protected speech, we have often focused on the
‘place’ of that speech, considering the nature of the forum the speaker
seeks to employ . . . .”149 “[T]he standards by which limitations on
speech must be evaluated differ depending on the character of the
property at issue,” the Court continued.150 Indeed, an individual
speaking in a “traditional public forum” (i.e., public space that has
been traditionally used for expressive conduct and that the
government has intentionally dedicated for expressive conduct)151 is
generally entitled to greater constitutional protection than if the
speech were to take place in a “non-public forum” (i.e., public space
that the government has neither dedicated nor opened up for
expressive conduct)152—even if the same individual engages in the
same exact speech in both areas. Space is thus relevant in delineating
the meaning of First Amendment protection, though the underlying
speech or expressive conduct is otherwise equal in all other respects.
Similarly, the distinctive characteristics of prisons generally call for
distinctive legal rules. The Supreme Court, for example, observed
that a correctional facility is “a unique place fraught with serious
security dangers.”153 Other social spaces have drawn the Court’s
attention for their unique attributes. The Court, in a memorable
opinion by Justice Fortas, acknowledged the “special characteristics
of the school environment,” rejecting nonetheless any suggestion that

148. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008) (holding that the
Suspension Clause reached detainees held in the Naval Base in Guantanamo because
the United States exercises complete and exclusive control over the base).
149. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 479 (1988).
150. Id. (internal quotes and citation omitted).
151. See Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761
(1995) (“If [the property in question is a public forum], a State’s right to limit
protected expressive activity is sharply circumscribed: It may impose reasonable,
content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions (a ban on all unattended
displays, which did not exist here, might be one such), but it may regulate expressive
content only if such a restriction is necessary, and narrowly drawn, to serve a
compelling state interest.” (emphasis added)).
152. See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679 (1992)
(providing that government regulation of speech “need only be reasonable” and the
regulation cannot be “an effort to suppress the speaker’s activity due to disagreement
with the speaker’s view”).
153. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979).
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“students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”154 Of course, there are
other examples as well.155
The question becomes whether considerations of space also should
play a role in a legal determination as to whether terrorism has taken
place. To demonstrate the propriety of taking space into account for
purposes of assessing whether terrorism has occurred, one need look
no further than cities—the spaces that serve as centers for civic and
political affairs, in which people are heavily concentrated relative to
other areas, and that facilitate commercial and social exchange
between otherwise non-connected individuals.156
In describing the special qualities of cities, Lyn Lofland, for
example, refers to a city as “the locus of a peculiar social situation: the
people to be found within its boundaries at any given moment know
nothing personally about the vast majority of others with whom they
share this space.”157 Jerry Frug similarly notes that cities “put people
in contact, whether they like it or not, with men and women who have
values, opinions, or desires that they find unfamiliar, strange, even
offensive.”158 Further, Frug explains, cities are characterized by
“[s]ocial differentiation without exclusion[,] mean[ing] the formation
of a multiplicity of group affinities . . . in an atmosphere that

154. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
155. See, e.g., Erbsen, supra note 19, at 1176 (“[C]ourts have defined spaces to aid
in applying constitutional provisions that lack a clear physical scope,
including . . . ‘open fields’ under the Fourth Amendment.”). I argue that Congress
may utilize its enforcement power under the Thirteenth Amendment to address
entrenched urban poverty. See generally Dawinder S. Sidhu, The Unconstitutionality
of Urban Poverty, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (2012). In conversation, a leading
constitutional scholar construed this as a geographic model for the application of the
Thirteenth Amendment.
156. This sense of a “city” is not dependent upon its more technical definitions,
which focus on authority and power, rather than content and humanity. See, e.g., 42
U.S.C. § 5302(a)(5) (2006). The statute defines “city” as:
(A) any unit of general local government which is classified as a
municipality by the United States Bureau of the Census or (B) any other
unit of general local government which is a town or township and which, in
the determination of the Secretary [of the Department of Housing and
Urban Development], (i) possesses powers and performs functions
comparable to these associated with municipalities, (ii) is closely settled, and
(iii) contains within its boundaries no incorporated places as defined by the
United States Bureau of the Census.

Id.
157. Jerry Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1047, 1049
(1996) (quoting LYN H. LOFLAND, A WORLD OF STRANGERS: ORDER AND ACTION IN
URBAN PUBLIC SPACE 3 (1973)).
158. Id. at 1050.
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promotes their intermingling.”159 Cities, he writes, are permeable
because they are “open to anyone whatsoever,” and the sort of
intellectual and cultural intercourse that a city fosters “provides
exposure to opinions and cultures very different from one’s own.”160
Arguably, then, cities offer the space where democracy—from
informal debates to institutional policymaking—and the market—
from a bustling bazaar to a sophisticated securities exchange—are
most alive. All of this is made possible by a robust, hard
infrastructure, including public transportation systems (e.g., subway),
roads, sewers, water works, and digital soft infrastructures that
facilitate commerce and everyday information-sharing in cafés, offices
and other settings.161
The open, accessible nature of cities is highlighted by New York
City’s response to 9/11. Very shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks
that defied our imagination162 and devastated the nation,163 New York
City, the city most affected by the attacks, expressly invited
individuals to visit. The then-mayor of New York City, Rudolph
Giuliani, instituted a campaign to encourage others to experience the
city’s sights and sounds. “I urge everyone to come visit New York,”
he said.164 Another official made clear that the post-9/11 “message”
from the city was that “we were open for business.”165
The aforementioned virtues of a city—its diverse and fluid
population, political centrality, cultural and artistic offerings,
economic energy, critical infrastructure, and openness—also make it

159. Id. at 1051
160. Id. at 1051 (discussing IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF
DIFFERENCE 238–40 (1990)).
161. See generally Witold Rybczynski & Peter D. Linneman, How to Save Our
Shrinking Cities, 135 PUB. INT. 30, 31 (1999) (describing the development of modern
cities, which are characterized by “urban infrastructure technology, such as water
supply, sewage treatment,” public transportation, and telecommunication
capabilities).
162. See NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT 336 (2004) (“The most important failure [with respect to the
U.S. not deterring or delaying the attacks of 9/11 was one] of imagination.”).
163. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 568 (2006) (“Americans will never
forget the devastation wrought by these acts. Nearly 3,000 civilians were killed.”).
164. See Press Release, N.Y.C. Mayor’s Office, Mayor Giuliani Launches Public
Service Campaign that Encourages Tourism to the City, and Salutes the “Miracle of
New York” (Nov. 8, 2001), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/html/2001b/
pr351-01.html.
165. Robin Pogrebin, How Broadway Bounced Back After 9/11; But Downtown
Theater Lacked the Right Ties, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/
2002/05/22/theater/how-broadway-bounced-back-after-9-11-but-downtown-theaterlacked-the-right-ties.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.
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an attractive site for a terrorist attack. Indeed, a city may be targeted
by terrorists precisely because of its accessibility (i.e., the ability to
enter a city and blend in), the practical impact that an attack may
have on its civic and social life, the vast amount of potential victims,
and the symbolic value of attacking a prominent landmark or
geographical area.166 It therefore may not come as a surprise that
major cities, including Boston,167 New York,168 London,169 Madrid,170
Mumbai,171 Moscow,172 and Tokyo,173 have suffered and absorbed
terrorist attacks.
The case of New York City particularly demonstrates terrorists’
propensity to target cities. Aside from well-known incidents, such as
the 1993174 and 2001175 attacks on the World Trade Center, and the

166. See, e.g., MacWade v. Kelly, No. 05CIV6921RMBFM, 2005 WL 3338573, at
*4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2005) (recounting expert testimony on the attractiveness of
cities’ transportation systems to terrorists).
167. See Indictment, United States v. Tsarnaev, No. 1:13CR10200, 2013 WL
3215742, ¶¶ 3, 6–7 (D. Mass. June 27, 2013).
168. See NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., supra note 162,
at 279–80 (describing the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center); id. at 285–89, 293,
305–06, 311 (describing the 2001 attack on the World Trade Center).
169. See 7 July London Attacks, GUARDIAN (London), http://www.guardian.co.uk/
uk/july7 (last visited Oct. 18, 2013) (compiling information on the July 7, 2005
bombing in a London subway station and bus).
170. See Scores Die in Madrid Bomb Carnage, BBC NEWS (Mar. 11, 2004),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3500452.stm (reporting on the multiple blasts at
three Madrid train stations, in which 173 people were killed).
171. See Vikas Bajaj & J. David Goodman, 3 Bombs Hit Crowded Sites in
Mumbai, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/14/world/asia/
14mumbai.html (describing the 2011 Mumbai attacks on “central locations in the city,
including the crowded Dadar neighborhood; Zaveri Bazaar, a popular jewelry
market; and near the Opera House”); Scores Dead in Mumbai Train Bombs, BBC
NEWS (July 11, 2006), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/5169332.stm (covering the
killing of over 160 people, by seven coordinated bombings, aboard Mumbai
commuter trains); Somini Sengupta, At Least 100 Dead in India Terror Attacks, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 26, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/27/world/asia/27mumbai.html
(reporting on the 2008 Mumbai attacks on multiple locations, including two hotels,
train station, and movie theater).
172. See Moscow Bombing: Carnage at Russia’s Domodedovo Airport, BBC NEWS
(Jan. 24, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-12268662 (describing the
suicide bombing at a Moscow airport).
173. See Nicholas D. Kristof, Poison Gas Fills Tokyo Subway; Six Die and
Hundreds are Hurt, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1995, http://www.nytimes.com/
1995/03/20/world/poison-gas-fills-tokyo-subway-six-die-and-hundreds-are-hurt.html
(noting Sarin gas attacks on three Tokyo train stations).
174. See NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., supra note 158,
at 279–80.
175. See id. at 285–89, 293, 305–06, 311.
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failed 2010 Times Square bombing,176 New York City has been
targeted a significant number of times in recent years: according to
the deputy commissioner of the New York Police Department in
roughly a three-month span in 2007, there were “22 bomb threats and
31 intelligence leads related to subway attack[s]” alone.177 At least
thirteen specific terror plots against New York City have been
foiled,178 the official disclosed, including a plot to bomb the New York
Stock Exchange.179
A cost of the human, cultural, and financial flux that a city offers,
and of the openness required to facilitate that ongoing flow of
residents, consumers, businessmen, etc., is the possibility that an
unsavory person or persons may use the same avenue for entry and
enjoy the cover of relative anonymity to plot and implement a violent
attack against innocents. The United States is an open society,
particularly in cities; and that national virtue, which reflects our
democratic and immigrant nature, creates both penetrability and
opportunity for anti-social actors. The day after the 9/11 atrocities,
Michael R. Gordon of the New York Times wrote that the terrorists
“used the very accessibility of an open society to wound that
society.”180 Referring to the special circumstances of space, Gordon
noted that “[i]t is relatively easy to defend a military base or fortified
bunker,” but “virtually impossible to insulate all . . . government
buildings and commercial centers against a suicide attacker.”181 For
abusing and exploiting the vulnerability of our open society, some
176. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Faisal Shahzad
Pleads Guilty in Manhattan Federal Court to 10 Federal Crimes Arising from
Attempted Car Bombing in Times Square (June 21, 2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/June/10-ag-721.html (“On May 1, 2010, [Faisal]
Shahzad drove [a Nissan] Pathfinder, loaded with the improvised explosive and
incendiary devices, to Manhattan and parked the Pathfinder in Times Square . . . .
After parking the Pathfinder, Shahzad attempted [but failed] to begin the detonation
process of the improvised explosive and incendiary devices. Thereafter, Shahzad
abandoned the Pathfinder . . . .”).
177. Carol Eisenberg, Waking Up to Terror, NEWSDAY, Mar. 7, 2007, at 1,
available at 2007 WLNR 4305365.
178. See Jessica Zuckerman, Fifty-Third Terror Plot Foiled Since 9/11: Bombing
Targets U.S. Financial Hub, HERITAGE FOUND. (Oct. 17, 2012),
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/10/terror-plot-foiled-in-new-yorkbombing-targets-us-financial-hub.
179. See Kris Van Cleave, NSA Director Says N.Y. Stock Exchange Terror Plot
Foiled, WJLA (June 18, 2013), http://www.wjla.com/articles/2013/06/nsa-directorsays-n-y-stock-exchange-terror-plot-foiled-90260.html.
180. Michael R. Gordon, When an Open Society Is Wielded as a Weapon Against
Itself, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/12/us/day-terrorassessment-when-open-society-wielded-weapon-against-itself.html.
181. Id.
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may agree with Gordon’s assessment that the attacks of 9/11, when
compared to others, were especially “sinister.”182 As New York City
and the 9/11 attacks demonstrate, space, and cities are relevant in the
terrorism context.
B.

Space and Terrorism

If space matters when it comes to determining whether terrorism
has occurred, the question becomes how considerations of space
merge with, or otherwise relate to, the two principal reasons for
codifying terrorism as an independent cognizable harm: enabling
society to express its strong disapproval of the underlying conduct by
way of branding the perpetrator a “terrorist,” and allowing the law to
give effect to this social judgment by way of imposing severe
punishments on the perpetrator. These purposes appear especially
salient when an incident of mass violence occurs in a city
environment.
First, an individual who targets an area huddled with innocents is
more deserving of the social stigma and identity of a terrorist than
one who commits the same underlying act in an area with a lower
concentration of innocents. A bombing along a crowded city
sidewalk or a busy subway station is qualitatively different than a
bombing in space that is less crowded and open to individuals because
of the significant number of innocents that may be implicated. The
diversity and fluidity of the innocents in a city only, who may be from
different nations, religions, and backgrounds, widens the universe of
individuals who may be impacted. A target location that is more
homogenous, sparsely populated, and less inviting to outsiders, by
contrast, may have a smaller net of potential direct and indirect
victims.
Second, a legal charge of terrorism allows these social benefits to
flow and enables the government to join and echo the social judgment
that the perpetrator has committed a particularly heinous crime
worthy of the full weight of legal punishments.183 It is true that a
perpetrator of an attack on innocents in a city could be charged with
other offenses, such as the use of a weapon of mass destruction, which

182. See id.
183. See Hodgson & Tadros, supra note 15, at 497 (“[Terrorism] triggers the use of
terrorism law. The body of terrorism law consists of an extended set of state powers
that apply where terrorism is concerned. The definition of terrorism determines
when these powers are triggered.”).
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was one of the charges against the surviving Tsarnaev brother.184 One
charged with that offense could face the death penalty.185
Accordingly, one may argue that the legal punishment that Tsarnaev
may receive pursuant to a terrorism charge would be no “better” than
the punishment that would attach to other charges. While the
technical sentence could be identical, in modern times the label of
“terrorist,” when affixed by society and firmly secured by the law,
carries with it a unique and special meaning that perhaps is unlike any
label that other possible charges could convey or signify.186
Accordingly, the purposes of having terrorism as an independent
legal harm appear to be furthered by an appreciation for the spatial
dimensions of a given act.
Naturally, the question may arise whether incidents in other areas,
aside from cities, may similarly point towards the terrorism
designation when premeditated mass violence indiscriminately
directed at innocents takes place within them. Though an exhaustive
exploration of every setting in a society is impracticable, it is possible
to identify other areas that may call for the terrorism designation if a
premeditated, indiscriminate act of mass violence happens in that
physical context.
To be sure, incidents do not automatically become “terrorism”
when they take place within the confines of a city. It is the attributes
of a city, not the municipal borders or responsibilities, which matter.
Instead, the high composition and fluid nature of the population are
what lends space within a city to the terrorism designation.
Accordingly, in examining other potential spaces that may draw
heightened attention in a terrorism analysis, it is necessary to look to
these practical attributes instead of technical formalisms.
Other physical settings exist that share the critical characteristics of
cities. Certain places of public accommodation, such as restaurants,
hotels, entertainment venues, and sporting arenas, generally contain
many people and are open to a wide assortment of different people.
Accordingly, an attack in one of these places would have more

184. See Indictment, United States v. Tsarnaev, No. 1:13CR10200, 2013 WL
3215742, ¶¶ 11–40 (D. Mass. June 27, 2013).
185. See 18 U.S.C. § 2332a(a) (2012) (“[I]f death results [from the use of a weapon
of mass destruction], [the defendant] shall be punished by death or imprisoned for
any term of years or for life.”).
186. It is for this reason that, even if considerations of space or density are factored
at the sentencing phase in a conviction for a non-terrorism charge, the specific
“terrorism” label is appropriate and beneficial: it carries a unique meaning that is not
captured in punishment. That is, “terrorism” should be affixed at the front-end in the
charging document, rather than on the back-end only at the sentencing phase.
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potential victims.
Moreover, these areas may be open to
heterogeneous populations and the chilling effect on future patronage
may be high as well. These factors may help explain why terrorists
have demonstrated an interest in targeting certain places of public
accommodation, such as the Taj Mahal Place Hotel in Mumbai,187 a
pizzeria in Jerusalem,188 a beachfront restaurant in Haifa, Israel,189 and
a café in Marrakeh.190 Again, the key to such an analysis of whether
an attack may deserve the terrorism label must hinge on the actual
facts of the situation—e.g., whether the location generally has a large,
fluid public presence—not whether it qualifies as a “place of public
accommodation” under the law.191 Indeed, a restaurant that is heavily
frequented is qualitatively different than one that is not, even if they
both fall within the meaning of a place of public accommodation
more broadly.
Other spaces may warrant special attention to determine whether
terrorism charges should apply, even if the essential spatial elements
discussed thus far—significant, fluid population—are not present.
These places are those accorded constitutional significance, such as
places of worship192 or civic associations,193 and those that are essential
to the operation of the democracy itself, such as government
buildings, schools, or polling booths.
In short, under the aforementioned rubric:

187. See Rohit Deshpandé & Anjali Raina, The Ordinary Heroes of the Taj, 89
HARV. BUS. REV. 119 (2011); Sengupta, supra note 171.
188. See Clyde Haberman, At Least 14 Dead as Suicide Bomber Strikes Jerusalem,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/08/10/world/at-least-14dead-as-suicide-bomber-strikes-jerusalem.html.
189. See Verity Murphy, Mid-East Cycle of Vengeance, BBC NEWS (Oct. 5, 2003),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3165604.stm.
190. See Michael Slackman & Souad Mekhennet, Bomb Strikes Moroccan Cafe,
Killing Mostly Foreigners, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/04/29/world/africa/29morocco.html.
191. For example, the regulations implementing the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 define a “place of public accommodation” as “a facility, operated by a
private entity, whose operations affect commerce and fall within at least one of the
following categories,” such as a hotel, restaurant, movie theater, “place of public
gathering,” a “sales or rental establishment,” “place of public display or collection,”
“place of recreation,” “place of education,” “social service center establishment,” and
“place of exercise.” 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2013).
192. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the
free exercise [of religion.]”).
193. See id. (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the . . . right of the people
peaceably to assemble . . . .”).
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“Terrorism”
means
premeditated
violence
perpetrated
indiscriminately against innocents. Factors that may support the
terrorism designation are whether the violence was—
(a) perpetrated in
(1) an area with a high concentration of innocents (e.g.,
a city or place of public accommodation),
(2) a public area of constitutional significance wherein
individuals congregate or associate, or
(3) an area essential to the operation of the government
wherein individuals work, engage in official
government business, or are educated, or
(b) calculated to further a political, religious, or social agenda.
Note that subsection (a) comports with the overlooked descriptive
meaning of terrorism, and (b) with the dominant instrumental view of
terrorism. This paradigm allows for both conceptions of terrorism to
be activated.
There is some precedence in federal law for this special
consideration of space in the context of mass violence. For example,
18 U.S.C. § 2332f makes it unlawful for anyone to “deliver[], place[],
discharge[], or detonate[] an explosive or other lethal device in, into,
or against a place of public use, a state or government facility, a public
transportation system, or an infrastructure facility . . . with the intent
to cause death or serious bodily injury.”194 But a violation of this
statute is not, within the text of the statute, “terrorism.”195
Accordingly, it is not a vehicle for the powerful social term for
terrorism. Section 2332f would better reflect the proposal in this
Article if it expressly defined violations as acts of “terrorism. That
said, this statute does demonstrate that, in federal law, special
consideration of space in the context of mass violence already
exists.196
The spatial formulation of terrorism in this Article includes motive,
an otherwise fundamental component of terrorism definitions in
current federal law, only as a supplement to the core definition.197
While a definition of terrorism that requires evidence of motive
comports with an instrumental understanding of terrorism, the
purposes of the terrorism designation—to signal society’s significant
disapproval of a given incident of mass violence because of the

194.
195.
196.
197.

18 U.S.C. § 2332f(a) (2012).

See id.
See generally § 2332(f)(a).
See supra Part II.A.
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intentional targeting of innocents on a large scale, and to enable the
government to formally sanction the perpetrator by way of law—are
satisfied irrespective of why the perpetrator committed the
underlying act. Indeed, an act of mass violence kills, maims, injures,
chills, and psychologically scars those immediately present, those in
and around the targeted area, and those connected to the victims
regardless of whether the perpetrator’s motive was political, social, or
religious, or whether there was any motive at all. There are also
evidentiary problems with resting the application of terrorism on
motive. In some instances, such as with the Oak Creek and Newtown
incidents, motive cannot be ascertained because the perpetrators died
(more specifically, killed themselves) at the scene.198 To allow the
perpetrators the ability to escape the powerful social and legal term of
“terrorist” because they killed innocents without revealing their
motive would be to withdraw from the people and the government a
meaningful means by which to sanction the perpetrator of a horrific
crime.
At the end of the day, the impact is not predicated or dependent
upon the reasoning of the perpetrator, whether it is available or not.
And it is the impact on targeted innocents that lies at the foundation
of the strong social distaste for terrorism and the attendant legal
punishment.199 In this sense, the terrorism definition proposed here
incorporates an appreciation for what happened, not necessarily why
it happened.
To be sure, this does not mean that there is no room for motive in a
terrorism analysis. Rather, this Article suggests that terrorism as a
social and legal construct does not require motive in order to be
activated. In other words, under this proposed scheme, motive would
add nuance to, but not be the touchstone for, the definition of
terrorism.
For two reasons, under this proposal, motive-based terrorism
constitutes a statutory subsection instead of the whole provision.
First, practically speaking, completely omitting motive-based
terrorism may be too drastic. Second, there is value in allowing
society and the law to condemn harms premised on motive. A person
198. See Quijano, supra note 125; Simpson et al., supra note 4.
199. See Dru Stevenson, Entrapment and Terrorism, 49 B.C. L. REV. 125, 139
(2008) (“[T]he stakes are plainly higher for deterring or incapacitating perpetrators
of terrorism, as opposed to the traditional ‘victimless’ crimes,” precisely because
“[t]errorists . . . kill and maim innocent civilians, destroy private property, and disrupt
daily life and commerce.”); id. at 140 (“This point is nothing new; it is obvious from
events of the last decade that terrorism is a special category of crime, something
particularly horrific [compared to other crimes.]”).
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who commits an act of mass violence against innocents for political
purposes not only injures individuals by way of his or her actions (an
objective harm), but undermines the political process that exists to
resolve such political disputes (an instrumental harm).200 By the same
token, killing innocents in a violent premeditated attack is not only a
wrong in itself (an objective harm), but, when done in the context of a
political conflict, may be especially worthy of condemnation because
it undermines how violence is to be conducted within the bounds of
the laws of war.201 Accordingly, this formulation does not sever
motive from terrorism, but includes it as a subsidiary arm of a broader
terrorism definition.
The importance of coercion or intimidation found in traditional
notions of terrorism is not lost in the proposed definition either.202
Rather, coercion and intimidation may be assumed to be inherent
aspects and consequences of an act of mass violence directed at
innocents instead of elements of the offense to be supported by
evidence. One need not have proof of intent to impose undue
pressures on the victims; those external forces are there by virtue of
the deed itself. It may be argued that motive to coerce or intimidate
still must be known because the targets must be aware of exactly what
they are being compelled to do, or not do, by way of the violent
influence. Yet an identifiable motive is not necessary to cause terror,
coerce, intimidate, or otherwise trigger emotion-based changes in
behavior. For example, in the aftermath of the Oak Creek shooting
at a Sikh temple, members of the Sikh community nationwide were
put on edge, even though the motive behind the Oak Creek attack
was a mystery (and remains so today).203 That the immediate and
wider Sikh community was placed in a state of terror speaks to the
accomplishment of an emotional response irrespective of an
identifiable motive.204 Accordingly, a model of terrorism that focuses

200. See Hodgson & Tadros, supra note 15, at 502 (“[P]ursuing political aims
violently might be wrong in part because it subverts a legitimate political process . . . .
Terrorism undermines the assurance each citizen has that all political conflicts will be
resolved through the democratic process.”).
201. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
202. See 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5) (2012).
203. Indeed, though hundreds of miles away from Oak Creek, and though Page
himself had perished in the Oak Creek shooting, the Sikh temples to which I
belong—the Guru Gobind Singh Foundation in Travillah, Maryland, and the Guru
Nanak Foundation of America in Silver Spring, Maryland—both had armed,
uniformed police officers guard the temples during services immediately following
the tragedy. This speaks to the element of “intimidation” or “fear” that arguably
existed, even though Page’s motive remains unknown. See id.
204. See id.
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on conditions and facts, rather than intent, may still contemplate and
encompass the emotion-based reactions that may be seen by some to
be critical to the appropriateness of the terrorism label.
In applying this suggested rubric, each of the four recent incidents
described at the start of this Article would be considered an act of
terrorism. First, the shooting at a movie theater in Aurora, Colorado,
satisfies the proposed definition because it was premeditated and an
indiscriminate targeting of innocents.205 For good measure, it was at a
place of public accommodation at which many innocents were
present.206 As these factors, by themselves, would tip the balance in
favor of the terrorism designation, the fact that James Holmes’s
motive is unknown207 would not have, as it does today, preclusive
effect over the potential application of federal terrorism laws.208
Second, the shooting at a Sikh temple in Oak Creek, Wisconsin, was
an act of terrorism under this proposed framework because it was
premeditated and an indiscriminate targeting of innocents.209 Should
there be any doubt about whether the incident qualifies as terrorism,
it may be pointed out that the incident took place at a setting—a
place of worship where individuals gather to exercise their religion—
afforded special protection in the Constitution.210 The failure to know
why Wade Michael Page went on the shooting rampage does not
prevent the terrorism label from applying here, as the other factors
get us over the hump.211 Third, the shooting at the elementary school
in Newtown, Connecticut, is terrorism within the meaning of this
proposed framework because it was a premeditated and
indiscriminate killing of innocents, including children.212 Further, the
shooting took place at a school, one of the spaces in American society
that, because of the importance of education, holds special value in
our constitutional scheme.213 Fourth, the Boston Marathon bombing
is terrorism because it was a premeditated and indiscriminate
targeting of innocents.214 In addition, the bombing took place in a

205. See supra notes 111–13 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
207. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
208. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 13, at 1.
209. See supra notes 120–122 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 148–52 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 120–22 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 133–34 and accompanying text.
213. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“Today, education is
perhaps the most important function of state and local governments . . . . It is the very
foundation of good citizenship.”).
214. See supra notes 137–38 and accompanying text.
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major city at a major event, when the number of potential victims
would be particularly high and the fluidity of the people particularly
pronounced.215
With respect to the benefits of such a construction, the primary
advantages are its clarity and consistency, which are currently lacking
in the federal definition of terrorism.216 The present state of
confusion in the terrorism laws is perhaps best demonstrated by the
response to the Boston bombings, where the President first claimed
the bombings were a terrorist attack without knowing who committed
the attack, or why, in contravention of the terrorism laws’
requirement of motive. Once it came to light that the motive was
political and religious in nature, which would seem to satisfy terrorism
laws, the surviving brother was not charged with a terrorism offense.
Moreover, the definition, because of its descriptive component,
truly captures the nature of terrorist activity today. Philip Bobbitt,
for example, observes that al-Qaeda “does not simply want to seize
the governing apparatus of a particular national state,” but also
“attempts to achieve a constant state of terror.”217 That is, modern
terrorism is not only a “technique” to provoke political change,
Bobbitt notes, but “an end in itself.”218 It is, in other words,
instrumental and descriptive. The dual definition of terrorism aligns
with this reality.
Further, it promotes the purposes of having independent terrorism
laws in the first place. Indeed, this formulation, which looks to
descriptive action, not just instrumental intent, allows the social and
legal consequences to flow even if the perpetrator’s reasoning is kept
within the confines of his or her twisted brain. In this sense, a
descriptive focus places the facts in charge of whether those social and
legal consequences will be activated. By contrast, a perpetrator
currently can enjoin those consequences by dying and joining the
bloodshed at the scene. Page and Lanza, for example, both killed
themselves in the course of their mass shootings.219 Their suicides
should not entitle these perpetrators to the windfall of avoiding the
label of “terrorists,” or from enabling society thereafter from
properly conceptualizing what happened. A formulation driven by
facts and objective action is thus preferable to one dependent solely
upon subjective intent.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
PHILIP BOBBITT, TERROR AND CONSENT 62 (2008).

Id.
See Quijano, supra note 125; Simpson et al., supra note 4.

2013]

SPATIAL TERRORISM

119

In addition, this proposed definition reduces the possibility that the
terrorism designation will be premised upon the racial or religious
identity of the perpetrator. At present, there is a sense that
individuals from certain countries or religious traditions, primarily
Muslims, will be more likely to be found to be terrorists than
individuals from other communities.220 If terrorism is grounded in
action, there is a diminished opportunity for intent to be reflexively
inferred from identity and for any one group to be presumptively
deemed terrorists. With an overview of the contents of the proposed
definition and its potential benefits, it is now appropriate to refine the
contours of the definition.
IV. CLARIFYING THOUGHTS
This proposed shift in definitions of terrorism—precipitated by an
understanding that space is relevant and supportive of an objective or
descriptive terrorism paradigm—will invariably provoke questions
and concerns. The final Part of this Article responds to six
anticipated counterarguments.
First, there is the “dilution” counterargument. Four out of four
incidents—Aurora, Oak Creek, Newtown, and Boston—would
qualify as terrorism under the Article’s proposed framework, where
the outcome would be different under the existing paradigm.
Accordingly, some may claim that the suggested definition of
terrorism is too generous, and that the significance of terrorism will
be lost or minimized as to incidents to which it should be applied.221
In response to that argument, I note that, under the current regime,
the social and legal reasons for having independent terrorism laws are

220. See Muneer I. Ahmad, A Race Shared by Law: Post-September 11 Racial
Violence as Crimes of Passion, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1259, 1311 (2004) (“[B]ecause the
logic of post-September 11 hate violence depends upon a substitution of anyone
‘Muslim-looking’ for the terrorists, the claims of loyalty are more troubling; once this
substitution is made, it is all ‘Muslim-looking’ people, and not merely the nineteen
terrorists, who are presumptively disloyal.”); Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the
Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575, 1576 (2002) (“September 11 facilitated the
consolidation of a new identity category that groups together persons who appear
‘Middle Eastern, Arab, or Muslim.’ This consolidation reflects a racialization
wherein members of this group are identified as terrorists, and are disidentified as
citizens.”).
221. See generally Geoffrey Sant, So Banks Are Terrorists Now? The Misuse of
the Civil Suit Provision of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 533 (2013)
(expressing concern with the overbreadth of a federal terrorism law); Chantal
Tortoroli, Note, Gangs of New York Are Terrorists? The Misapplication of the New
York Antiterrorism Statute Due to the Lack of Comprehensive Gang Legislation, 84
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 391 (2010) (same with respect to a state terrorism law).
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left unfulfilled. The definition of terrorism under federal law—
anchored in subjective motivation and without any textual allowance
for geographic variation—is underutilized and fosters inconsistent
results. Indeed, individuals already believe that the four examples
provided in this Article should be considered terrorism—President
Obama has said as much with respect to Boston, Attorney General
Holder with respect to Oak Creek, and commentators have said as
much with respect to Aurora and Newtown. Concerns about an
increase in terrorism designations in raw terms should give way to an
appreciation for the remedied mismatch between terrorism laws’
unsatisfactory and confusing outcomes, on one hand, and the
underlying purposes for those laws in the first place and prevailing
social judgments, on the other. At this point, anxiety that the
terrorism designation will be overinclusive and that the terrorism
label will lose its effect are speculative.222 In any case, it seems
unlikely that a term that remains so powerful in modern society will
somehow have little force when applied to random mass violence in
which innocents are targeted and/or killed.
Second, there is the “limiting principles” counterargument. If
terrorism is not restrained by the existence of subjective motive, what,
some may ask, prevents terrorism from extending to effectively all
senseless violence? There are several factors, however, that refine
and focus terrorism to an act which is 1) premeditated, 2)
indiscriminate, 3) violent, that is 4a) in a public location i) with a high
concentration of individuals, ii) with constitutional significance, or iii)
that is essential to the operation of the government, or 4b) calculated
to further a political, religious, or social agenda. These factors can
help distinguish terrorism from other acts of violence.
Third, the “indeterminacy” counterargument is based on the
concern that, while these aforementioned factors may, in theory,
regulate when a particular incident is terrorism, the factors
themselves are insufficiently defined and lead to arbitrary and
inconsistent application. The factors have workable definitions that
may guide their reliable and even-handed application.

222. A broader definition of terrorism may trigger real concerns over expanded
executive power in times of war. See Hodgson & Tadros, supra note 15, at 497 (“The
body of terrorism law consists of an extended set of state powers that apply where
terrorism is concerned. The definition of terrorism determines when these powers
are triggered.”). We should be mindful of such executive abuse, though it is curious
that the executive has failed to take advantage of that additional power when the
opportunity has presented itself. In the Tsarnaev case, for example, federal
prosecutors, under the direction of the Attorney General, could have charged the
surviving Tsarnaev brother with terrorism, but did not.
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“Premeditated,” for example, is an established term in criminal law.223
A killing made in the heat of the moment or without the proper
consideration would thus fall below the threshold culpability required
for terrorism.224 This is not to suggest that there are no problems with
“premeditation” as a technical term,225 but at the end of the day,
“premeditation” signals a state of mind that is particularly culpable,226
where the underlying action is supported by some measure of
reflection.227 “Indiscriminate” simply denotes that the violence is
against random, indistinguishable individuals.228 Article 51 of the
Geneva Conventions, for example, prohibits “indiscriminate attacks”
and notes that they strike individuals “without distinction.”229
Accordingly, an indiscriminate killing has no specific targets, and fails
to consider potential victims as separate individuals. A mass shooting
in which the perpetrator sprays an area with bullets to kill one or two
specific individuals is a targeted killing and, by definition, is not
indiscriminate, even if the carnage extends beyond the specific
targets. A workplace shooting by a disgruntled ex-employee230 or a
223. See, e.g., CAL. JURY INSTR. CRIM. 8.20 (Deliberate and Premeditated Murder)
(Thomson
Reuters,
Westlaw
updated
Sept.
2013)
(providing
that
“premeditation . . . means considered beforehand”); see id. (“[The] intent on the part
of the defendant to kill . . . must have been formed upon pre-existing reflection . . . .
The true test is not the duration of time, but rather the extent of the reflection.”).
224. See, e.g., id. (providing that premeditated murder does not include murder
which is committed “under a sudden heat of passion” or which is the product of “a
mere unconsidered and rash impulse”).
225. See BENJAMIN CARDOZO, LAW AND LITERATURE AND OTHER ESSAYS AND
ADDRESSES 100 (1931) (expressing concern about the “mystifying cloud of words”
such as “deliberation” and “premeditation,” adding that the difference between the
two is “so obscure that no jury hearing it for the first time can fairly be expected to
assimilate and understand it”).
226. See id. at 100 (indicating that a “lesser degree” offense is an “exercise of
mercy” by the jury).
227. See, e.g., DRESSLER, supra note 54, at 551 (providing that “to ‘premeditate’
means ‘to think about beforehand’”). Requiring “premeditation” is to serve as a
limiting principle on the application of the terrorist label. That said, to the extent
that “premeditation” may be sufficiently problematic, alternative regimes serving the
same purpose may be considered. One alternative is to reserve the terrorist
designation for murder committed “by certain means, such as by bombing, or poison,
or lying in wait, or torture.” Matthew A. Pauley, Murder by Premeditation, 36 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 145, 166 (1999). Another is to “leav[e] to courts and juries some
discretion to decide which murders are the most grievous and deserving of society’s
worst condemnation.” Id. at 166–67.
228. See Begorre-Bret, supra note 61, at 1996.
229. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I),
art. 51.4, June 8, 1977 (Protection of the Civilian Population).
230. See, e.g., Multiple People Shot Near Empire State Building, CBS NEWS (Aug.
24, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-201_162-57499732/multiple-people-shot-
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gang-related shooting231 could not be deemed terrorism for this
reason. “Violence” would be limited to the use of firearms,
explosives, or other devices that have the capacity to maim or kill
many people.232 Accordingly, violence by way of fistfights or small
capacity instruments of violence, such as a knife, would not qualify as
terrorism because the potential to harm many people quickly is not
present. The rubric also would leave “duds” outside of the terrorism
designation, such as a homemade device intended to maim or kill
many people that lacks that actual capacity. It also would eliminate
cyber-attacks from the ambit of terrorism. “A location with a high
concentration of individuals” refers to physical spaces where there is
a large and fluid population, such as cities or certain places of public
accommodation.233 Temporary population density—a sporting event
at a football stadium, for example—may be a suitable metric to
determine when a physical location has such characteristics. “A
public location with constitutional significance” means a physical
setting open to the general public that is essential to the exercise of
rights expressly mentioned in the text of the Constitution, such as
places of worship and places where individuals associate to engage in
speech (e.g., a speakers’ corner in a public park, or a civic hall).234
This would eliminate from contention any public space that cannot
find a link to the express text of the Constitution, or any space closed
to others. “A location that is essential to the operation of the
government” refers to a space critical to the success of our democratic
society, such as schools, government buildings, and polling booths.235
Even if these three spaces were given a narrow construction, they
would still serve to hone terrorism on locations that have many

near-empire-state-building (“A man laid off about a year ago went to his former
workplace . . . and shot a co-worker in the face, killing him . . . .”).
231. See, e.g., Dean Reynolds, Even Tiniest Chicagoans Caught in Gang Crossfire,
CBS NEWS (July 2, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18563_162-57465408/eventiniest-chicagoans-caught-in-gang-crossfire/ (reporting on the death of seven-year-old
Heaven Sutton, where “Heaven was standing near the intended target . . . when the
gunman walked up and fired ten times,” striking and killing Heaven).
232. Such definitions can be taken from existing federal statutes. See, e.g., 18
U.S.C. § 2332f (2012) (prohibiting the use of “an explosive or other lethal device” in
certain places); id. 18 U.S.C. § 249(a) (2012) (prohibiting the use of “fire, a firearm, a
dangerous weapon, or an explosive or incendiary device” for certain purposes).
233. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 5302(5) (2006) (including “closely settled” as a defining
characteristic of a city).
234. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 192–93 and accompanying text.
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potential victims and whose impact would be quite problematic for
our society and public institutions.236
Fourth, there is the “media” counterargument. If a location with
constitutional significance may have a greater claim to terrorism, the
media should be able to invoke this principle because of the freedom
of the press that is expressly guaranteed and found in the First
Amendment.237 While the “freedom of press” clause in the First
Amendment provides a constitutional hook for the media to be
included in this paradigm, and while the media serve an important
role in society, the proposed definition would require that the
protected area of constitutional significance be open to the public.
Accordingly, to the extent that the media are places of business, an
incident of mass violence in such a place would not be within the
bounds of the terrorism definition advanced here.
Fifth, the “mental health” counterargument stresses that the
perpetrators of mass violence that have mental disabilities may not be
sufficiently morally or legally culpable to warrant the “terrorist”
label. There is a sense that some of the perpetrators of the incidents
described herein may suffer, or may have suffered, from mental
illness. This mental health concern has been raised particularly with
respect to James Holmes238 and Adam Lanza.239 This concern raises

236. A commentator on a draft of this Article suggests that, under the proposed
formulation, if gang member #1 shoots and kills an “innocent” on the side street near
his house as part of an initiation ritual (therefore, premeditated), then he is charged
with murder, yet if gang member #2 does the same act on the Washington Mall at
night he would be a terrorist, calling such different outcomes highly problematic and
arbitrary. I respectfully respond that this is not necessarily the outcome under my
proposed formulation. The same underlying act may be more harmful in the second
case if it is takes place in a dense area, has more potential victims, and can chill far
more people. Moreover, the gravamen of the analysis would be such facts, including
the population, rather than dictated by whether the shooting took place on a “street”
as opposed to a “city.” As this Article suggests, the general characteristics of a city
help explain why such spatial considerations are relevant in a fact-specific assessment
as to whether an act of terrorism has occurred.
237. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .”).
238. See Jack Healy, Suspect in Colorado Killings Enters Insanity Plea, N.Y.
TIMES, June 4, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/us/suspect-in-coloradomovie-killings-enters-insanity-plea.html?_r=0 (noting that Holmes has pleaded not
guilty by reason of insanity).
239. See Gabriella Rosen Kellerman, Diagnosing Adam Lanza, ATLANTIC (Dec.
16,
2012),
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/12/diagnosing-adamlanza/266322/# (“In the aftermath of the Sandy Hook massacre, reports have surfaced
that shooter Adam Lanza suffered from some sort of mental disability or disorder,
the exact nature of which is thus far a matter of dispute.”).
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the question as to the relationship between my proposed formulation
and the prospect that the perpetrator may be mentally ill.
In response to my Essay suggesting that Mr. Holmes should be
deemed a terrorist, Cord Jefferson, writing in The Nation, suggested
that Mr. Holmes might be mentally disturbed.240 As my proposed
definition of terrorism requires premeditation as a necessary element,
and as diminished mental capacity may preclude a finding of
premeditation,241 my definition would encompass or accommodate the
mental illness possibility noted by Mr. Jefferson.
Sixth, the “morality” counterargument suggests that this Article’s
attempt to root terrorism laws in a more descriptive or objective area,
and thereby sever current laws’ reliance on subjective intent, is itself
fraught with subjectivity.242 Indeed, some may seize on the stated
purposes of terrorism that has been described here—for society to
marginalize individuals for particularly reprehensible actions, and for
the law to memorialize that judgment and impose especially harsh
punishments on those who commit these sorts of deplorable attacks—
and expose the value-judgments underlying the purposes.243 What
counts as sufficiently reprehensible to warrant the public
determination to socially banish and brand an individual is inherently
subjective, some may say. The line between what is and what is not
damning is drawn by collective judgments that themselves may be
informed by the people’s religious, political, or social views,
experiences, biases, and backgrounds, skeptics may continue.
I concede this point. The law is a human institution; personal or
external considerations on legal decisions cannot be completely
eliminated, and thus find their way into our thinking on subjects, our

240. Cord Jefferson, Why Can’t Terrorists Be Mentally Ill Too?, NATION (July 25,
2012), http://www.thenation.com/blog/169063/why-cant-terrorists-be-mentally-ill-too.
241. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
242. See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text; see also Frederick V. Perry,
Multinationals at Risk: Terrorism and the Rule of Law, 7 FLA. INT’L U. L. REV. 43, 84
(2011) (“At the end of the day, there is a prevailing view . . . that terrorism is a
subjective matter, and that ‘one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom
fighter.’”) (citation omitted); Setty, supra note 96, at 6–7 (“The quest to establish a
universal definition of terrorism is entangled in questions of law, history, philosophy,
morality, and religion. Many scholars believe that the definitional question is, by
nature, a subjective one that eludes large-scale consensus.”).
243. See Begorre-Bret, supra note 61, at 1991 (“One cannot define terrorism
independently of the point of view one adopts. In that sense, the notion of terrorism
is intrinsically relativistic.”); see also Carol A. Bahan, International Terrorism: The
Legitimization of Safe Harbor States in International Law, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
333, 347 (2009/2010) (noting that definitions of terrorism depend on the definer’s
decision “to qualify and make exceptions to the general normative value that
terrorism is wrong”).
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decisionmaking processes, and into our final determinations.244 One
may still endeavor, nonetheless, to minimize undue influence on
important matters, and to focus decisionmakers on aspects or issues
that may guide proper analyses and ultimate conclusions.245 This is
not to ignore value-judgments, but to channel their attention to
factors that objectively matter, and to make a case for why those
factors matter more than an exclusive fixation on intent.
Defining terrorism in the wake of attacks on innocents and on our
feelings of safety generates insecurities and sensitivities that may
cloud otherwise dispassionate and principled decisionmaking.
Accordingly, the ability to filter through emotional and personal
considerations in this particular context is even more complicated.
Defining terrorism is an especially difficult human endeavor when
humanity itself is challenged. But, in the end, the enduring hope is
that considerations of space and what has occurred can bring us closer
to some semblance of clarity and shared consistency on the meaning
of terrorism. I am unconvinced that these potential criticisms, either
alone or in any combination, are sufficient to take this proposed
definition off the table.
CONCLUSION
An inquiry into ways to improve the definition of terrorism in
federal law is necessary, given the inconsistency in messages from our
primary federal leaders and the disappointing application of federal
terrorism law to recent domestic incidents of mass violence; the need
for this inquiry is further supported by the mismatch between what
federal law says about whether an incident constitutes terrorism, on
one hand, and political and social views as to what constitutes
terrorism, on the other. Current federal terrorism law is both unclear
and unsatisfactory.

244. See also OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Dover
Publications, Inc. 1991) (1881) (“The life of the law has not been logic: it has been
experience.”); RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A
TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY 26 (2006) (constitutional decisionmaking is
informed by “life experience and other personal factors”).
245. See generally John F. Irwin & Daniel L. Real, Unconscious Influences on
Judicial Decision-Making: The Illusion of Objectivity, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 10
(2010) (“If knowledge is power, simply recognizing the prevalence of implicit bias
and being open to the possibility that it is influencing our decision-making should be
the first step toward empowerment. Once acknowledged and thoughtfully
considered, the impacts of implicit biases can hopefully be reduced through a variety
of actions.”).
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This Article suggests that considerations of space are relevant in
ascertaining the difficult and complicated question of whether an
incident qualifies as terrorism. It is an examination of cities in
particular, I believe, that best showcases the relevance of space in
determining whether terrorism has occurred. Indeed, cities contain a
high concentration of individuals and those populations are not only
significant, but fluid. This means that the impact of an act of domestic
mass violence is wider and more deserving of the terrorist label than
incidents in other physical settings. This is not to suggest that only
highly packed places should receive special consideration in a
terrorism analysis; other areas within our society, because they have
been singled out in the Constitution and because of their significance
to our democracy, also warrant heightened attention. Spatial
considerations are valuable in their own right, and, in a broader sense,
point towards a definition of terrorism that is descriptive or objective
in nature, to be contrasted with the current model that is wholly
instrumental and essentially subjective.
This Article does not presume to solve the fundamental social and
legal problem in this nation of what terrorism means, but instead sets
a modest aim: to contribute to and enrich the conversation on the
meaning of terrorism. This Article, it is hoped, will facilitate the
development of a more coherent and well-received definition when
and if the contents of this powerful term are revisited by Congress.

